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Abstract
Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the
dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such
special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable dynamic analysis. Intuitively,
games that are “close” to a potential game should share similar properties. In this paper,
we formalize and develop this idea by quantifying to what extent the dynamic features of
potential games extend to “near-potential” games.
We study convergence of three commonly studied classes of adaptive dynamics: discrete-
time better/best response, logit response, and discrete-time fictitious play dynamics. For
better/best response dynamics, we focus on the evolution of the sequence of pure strategy
profiles and show that this sequence converges to a (pure) approximate equilibrium set,
whose size is a function of the “distance” from a close potential game. We then study logit
response dynamics parametrized by a smoothing parameter that determines the frequency
with which the best response strategy is played. Our analysis uses a Markov chain repre-
sentation for the evolution of pure strategy profiles. We provide a characterization of the
stationary distribution of this Markov chain in terms of the distance of the game from a
close potential game and the corresponding potential function. We further show that the
stochastically stable strategy profiles (defined as those that have positive probability un-
der the stationary distribution in the limit as the smoothing parameter goes to 0) are pure
approximate equilibria. Finally, we turn attention to fictitious play, and establish that in
near-potential games, the sequence of empirical frequencies of player actions converges to a
neighborhood of (mixed) equilibria of the game, where the size of the neighborhood increases
with distance of the game to a potential game. Thus, our results suggest that games that
are close to a potential game inherit the dynamical properties of potential games. Since a
close potential game to a given game can be found by solving a convex optimization prob-
lem, our approach also provides a systematic framework for studying convergence behavior
of adaptive learning dynamics in arbitrary finite strategic form games.
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1. Introduction
The study of multi-agent strategic interactions both in economics and engineering mainly
relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. This raises the question whether Nash equilibrium
makes approximately accurate predictions of the user behavior. One possible justification
for Nash equilibrium is that it arises as the long run outcome of dynamical processes, in
which less than fully rational players search for optimality over time. However, unless the
game belongs to special (but restrictive) classes of games, such dynamics do not converge to
a Nash equilibrium, and there is no systematic analysis of their limiting behavior (Jordan
1993, Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Shapley 1964).
Potential games is a class of games for which many of the simple user dynamics, such
as best response dynamics and fictitious play, converge to a Nash equilibrium (Monderer
and Shapley 1996b;a, Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Sandholm 2010, Young 2004). Intuitively,
dynamics in potential games and dynamics in games that are “close” (in terms of the payoffs
of the players) to potential games should be related. Our goal in this paper is to make
this intuition precise and provide a systematic framework for studying dynamics in finite
strategic form games by exploiting their relation to close potential games.
We start by illustrating via examples that this “continuity” property of limiting dynam-
ics need not hold for arbitrary games, i.e., games that are close in terms of payoffs may
have significantly different limiting behavior under simple user dynamics. Our first example
focuses on better response dynamics in which at each step or strategy profile, a player (cho-
sen consecutively or at random) updates its strategy unilaterally to one that yields a better
payoff. 1
Example 1.1. Consider two games with two players and payoffs given in Figure 1. The
entries of these tables indexed by row X and column Y show payoffs of the players when
the first player uses strategy X and the second player uses strategy Y. Let 0 < θ  1.
Both games have a unique Nash equilibrium: (B,B) for G1, and the mixed strategy profile(
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for G2.
We consider convergence of the sequence of pure strategy profiles generated by the better
response dynamics. In G1, the sequence converges to strategy profile (B,B). In G2, the
sequence does not converge (it can be shown that the sequence follows the better response
cycle (A,A), (B,A), (B,B) and (A,B)). Thus, trajectories are not contained in any -
equilibrium set for  < 2.
The second example considers fictitious play dynamics, where at each step, each player
maintains an (independent) empirical frequency distribution of other player’s strategies and
plays a best response against it.
Example 1.2. Consider two games with two players and payoffs given in Figure 2. Let
0 < θ  1. It can be seen that G1 has multiple equilibria (including pure equilibria (A,A),
1Consider a game where players are not indifferent between their strategies at any strategy profile. Arbi-
trarily small payoff perturbations of this game lead to games which have the same better response structure
as the original game. Hence, for a given game there may exist a close enough game such that the outcome
of the better response dynamics in two games are identical. However, for payoff differences of given size it is
always possible to find games with different better response properties as illustrated in Example 1.1.
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A 0, 1 0, 0
B 1, 0 θ, 2
G1
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A 0, 1 0, 0
B 1, 0 −θ, 2
G2
Figure 1: A small change in payoffs results in significantly different behavior for the pure
strategy profiles generated by the better response dynamics.
(B,B) and (C,C)), whereas G2 has a unique equilibrium given by the mixed strategy profile
where both players assign 1/3 probability to each of its strategies.
A B C
A 1, 1 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 1 1, 1 1, 0
C 1, 0 0, 1 1, 1
G1
A B C
A 1− θ, 1− θ 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 1 1− θ, 1− θ 1, 0
C 1, 0 0, 1 1− θ, 1− θ
G2
Figure 2: A small change in payoffs results in significantly different behavior for the empirical
frequencies generated by the fictitious play dynamics.
We focus on the convergence of the sequence of empirical frequencies generated by the
fictitious play dynamics (under the assumption that initial empirical frequency distribution
assigns probability 1 to a pure strategy profile, and whenever players are indifferent between
different strategies, they choose the lexicographically smaller one). In G1, this sequence con-
verges to a pure equilibrium starting from any pure strategy profile. In G2, the sequence
displays oscillations similar to those seen in the Shapley game (see Shapley (1964), Fuden-
berg and Levine (1998)). To see this, assume that the initial empirical frequency distribution
assigns probability 1 to the strategy profile (A,A). Observe that since the underlying game
is a symmetric game, empirical frequency distribution of each player will be identical at all
steps. Starting from (A,A), both players update their strategy to C. After sufficiently many
updates, the empirical frequency of A falls below θ/(1 + θ), and that of C exceeds 1/(1 + θ).
Thus, the payoff specifications suggest that both players start using strategy B. Similarly,
after empirical frequency of B exceeds 1/(1 + θ), and that of C falls below θ/(1 + θ), then
both players start playing A. Observe that update to a new strategy takes place only when one
of the strategies is being used with very high probability (recall that θ  1) and this feature
of empirical frequencies is preserved throughout. For this reason the sequence of empirical
frequencies does not converge to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), the unique Nash equilibrium of G2.
In this paper, in contrast with the preceding examples, we will show that games that
are close (in terms of payoffs of players) to potential games have similar limiting dynamics
to those in potential games. In particular, many reasonable adaptive dynamics “converge”
to an approximate equilibrium set, whose size is a function of the distance of the game
to a close potential game. Our approach relies on using the potential function of a close
3
potential game for the analysis of commonly studied update rules.2 We note that our results
hold for arbitrary strategic form games, however our characterization of limiting behavior of
dynamics is more informative for games that are close to potential games. We therefore focus
our investigation to such games in this paper and refer to them as near-potential games.
We start our analysis by introducing maximum pairwise difference, a measure of “close-
ness” of games. Let p and q be two strategy profiles, which differ in the strategy of a
single player, say player m. We refer to the change in the payoff of player m between these
two strategy profiles, as the pairwise comparison of p and q. Intuitively, this quantity cap-
tures how much player m can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from strategy
profile p to strategy profile q. For given games, the maximum pairwise difference is defined
as the maximum difference between the pairwise comparisons of these games. Thus, the
maximum pairwise difference captures how different two games are in terms of the utility
improvements due to unilateral deviations. Since equilibria of games, and strategy updates
in various update rules (such as better/best response dynamics) can be expressed in terms
of unilateral deviations, maximum pairwise difference provides a measure of strategic sim-
ilarities of games. We show that the closest potential game to a given game, in the sense
of maximum pairwise difference, can be obtained by solving a convex optimization problem.
This provides a systematic way of approximating a given game with a potential game that
has a similar equilibrium set and dynamic properties, as illustrated in Example 1.3.
Example 1.3. Consider a two-player game G, which is not a potential game, and the closest
potential game to this game (in terms of maximum pairwise difference), Gˆ, given in Figure 3.
The maximum pairwise difference of these games is 2, since the utility improvements in these
games due to unilateral deviations differ by at most 2 (For instance consider the deviation
of the column player from (A,A) to (A,B). In G this leads to a utility improvement of 6,
whereas, in Gˆ the improvement amount is 4). It can be seen that for both games (B,B)
is the unique equilibrium. Moreover, trajectories of better response dynamics and empirical
frequencies of fictitious play dynamics converge to this equilibrium in both games.
A B
A 8, 2 8, 8
B 2, 2 12, 10
G
A B
A 7, 3 9, 7
B 3, 1 11, 11
Gˆ
Figure 3: A game (G) and a nearby potential game (Gˆ) share similar equilibrium set and
dynamic properties.
We focus on three commonly studied user dynamics: discrete-time better/best response,
logit response, and discrete-time fictitious play dynamics, and establish different notions
of convergence for each. We first study better/best response dynamics. It is known that
the sequence of pure strategy profiles, which we refer to as trajectories, generated by these
2Throughout the paper, we use the terms learning dynamics and update rules interchangeably.
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update rules converge to pure Nash equilibria in potential games (Monderer and Shapley
1996b, Young 2004). In near-potential games, a pure Nash equilibrium need not even exist.
For this reason we focus on the notion of pure approximate equilibria or -equilibria, and show
that in near-potential games trajectories of these update rules converge to a pure approximate
equilibrium set. The size of this set only depends on the distance of the original game from
a potential game, and is independent of the payoffs in the original game.
We then focus on logit response dynamics. With this update rule, agents, when updating
their strategies, choose their best responses with high probability, but also explore other
strategies with a nonzero probability. Logit response induces a Markov chain on the set of
pure strategy profiles. The stationary distribution of this Markov chain is used to explain
the limiting behavior of this update rule (Young 1993, Blume 1997; 1993, Alo´s-Ferrer and
Netzer 2010, Marden and Shamma 2008). In potential games, the stationary distribution can
be expressed in closed form in terms of the potential function of the game. Additionally, the
stochastically stable strategy profiles, i.e., the strategy profiles which have nonzero stationary
distribution as the exploration probability goes to zero, are those that maximize the potential
function (Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer 2010, Blume 1997, Marden and Shamma 2008). Exploiting
their relation to close potential games, we obtain similar results for near-potential games: (i)
we obtain an explicit characterization of the stationary distribution in terms of the distance
of the game from a close potential game and the corresponding potential function, and
(ii) we show that the stochastically stable strategy profiles are the strategy profiles that
approximately maximize the potential of a close potential game, implying that they are pure
approximate equilibria of the game. Our analysis relies on a novel perturbation result for
Markov chains (see Theorem 5.1) which provides bounds on deviations from a stationary
distribution when transition probabilities of a Markov chain are multiplicatively perturbed,
and therefore may be of independent interest.
A summary of our convergence results on better/best response and logit response dy-
namics can be found in Table 1.
Update Rule Convergence Result
Better/Best Re-
sponse Dynamics
(Theorem 4.1) Trajectories of dynamics converge to Xδh, i.e., the
δh-equilibrium set of G.
Logit Response Dy-
namics (with pa-
rameter τ)
(Corollary 5.2) Stationary distribution µτ of logit response dynam-
ics is such that
∣∣∣∣µτ (p)− e 1τ φ(p)∑
q∈E e
1
τ φ(q)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ e 2δ(h−1)τ −1
e
2δ(h−1)
τ +1
, for all p.
Logit Response Dy-
namics
(Corollary 5.3) Stochastically stable strategy profiles of G are
(i) contained in S = {p|φ(p) ≥ maxq φ(q) − 4δ(h − 1)}, (ii) 4δh-
equilibria of G.
Table 1: Convergence properties of better/best response and logit response dynamics in
near-potential games. Given a game G, we use Gˆ to denote a nearby potential game with
potential function φ such that the distance (in terms of the maximum pairwise difference,
defined in Section 2) between the two games is δ. We use the notation X to denote the
-equilibrium set of the original game, h to denote the number of strategy profiles, µτ and µˆτ
to denote the stationary distributions of logit response dynamics in G and Gˆ, respectively.
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We finally analyze fictitious play dynamics in near-potential games. In potential games
trajectories of fictitious play need not converge to a Nash equilibrium, but the empirical
frequencies of the played strategies converge to a (mixed) Nash equilibrium (Monderer and
Shapley 1996a, Shamma and Arslan 2004). In our analysis of fictitious play dynamics,
we first show that in near-potential games if the empirical frequencies are outside some -
equilibrium set, then the potential of the close potential game (evaluated at the empirical
frequency distribution) increases with each strategy update. Using this result we establish
convergence of fictitious play dynamics to a set which can be characterized in terms of the
-equilibrium set of the game and the level sets of the potential function of a close potential
game. This result suggests that in near-potential games, the empirical frequencies of fictitious
play converge to a set of mixed strategies that (in the close potential game) have potential
almost as large as the potential of Nash equilibria. Moreover, exploring the property that for
small , -equilibria are contained in disjoint neighborhoods of equilibria, we strengthen our
result and establish that if a game is sufficiently close to a potential game, then empirical
frequencies of fictitious play dynamics converge to a small neighborhood of equilibria. This
result recovers as a special case convergence of empirical frequencies to Nash equilibria in
potential games.
A summary of our results on convergence of fictitious play dynamics is given in Table 2.
Update Rule Convergence Result
Fictitious Play
(Corollary 6.1) Empirical frequencies of dynamics converge to the set
of mixed strategies with large enough potential: {x ∈∏m ∆Em|φ(x) ≥
miny∈XMδ φ(y)}
Fictitious Play
(Theorem 6.2) Assume that G has finitely many equilibria. There exists
some δ¯ > 0, and ¯ > 0 (which are functions of utilities of G but not
δ) such that if δ < δ¯, then the empirical frequencies of fictitious play
converge to{
x
∣∣∣∣ ||x− xk|| ≤ 4f(Mδ)ML + f(Mδ + ), for some equilibrium xk
}
,
for any  such that ¯ ≥  > 0, where f : R+ → R+ is an upper
semicontinuous function such that f(x)→ 0 as x→ 0.
Table 2: Convergence properties of fictitious play dynamics in near-potential games. We
denote the number of players in the game by M , set of mixed strategies of player m by
∆Em, and the Lipschitz constant of the mixed extension of φ by L. Rest of the notation is
the same as in Table 1.
The framework provided in this paper enables us to study the limiting behavior of adap-
tive user dynamics in arbitrary finite strategic form games. In particular, for a given game
we can use the proposed convex optimization formulation to find a nearby potential game
and use the distance between these games to obtain a quantitative characterization of the
limiting approximate equilibrium set. The characterization this approach provides will be
tighter if the original game is closer to a potential game.
6
Related Literature: Potential games play an important role in game-theoretic analysis
because of existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and the stability (under various
learning dynamics such as better/best response dynamics) of pure Nash equilibria in these
games (Monderer and Shapley 1996b, Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Young 2004). Because of
these properties, potential games found applications in various control and resource allocation
problems (Monderer and Shapley 1996b, Marden et al. 2009a, Candogan et al. 2010a, Arslan
et al. 2007).
There is no systematic framework for analyzing the limiting behavior of many of the
adaptive update rules in general games (Jordan 1993, Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Shapley
1964). However, for potential games there is a long line of literature establishing convergence
of natural adaptive dynamics such as better/best response dynamics (Monderer and Shapley
1996b, Young 2004), fictitious play (Monderer and Shapley 1996a, Shamma and Arslan 2004,
Marden et al. 2009b, Hofbauer and Sandholm 2002) and logit response dynamics (Blume
1993; 1997, Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer 2010, Marden and Shamma 2008).
It was shown in recent work that a close potential game to a given game can be obtained
by solving a convex optimization problem (see Candogan et al. (2011; 2010b)). It was also
proved that equilibria of a given game can be characterized by first approximating this game
with a potential game, and then using the equilibrium properties of close potential games
(Candogan et al. 2011; 2010b). This paper builds on this line of work to study dynamics in
games by exploiting their relation to a close potential game.
Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We present the game
theoretic preliminaries for our work in Section 2. In Section 3, we explain how a close
potential game to a given game can be found, and discuss possible extensions of this approach.
We present an analysis of better and best response dynamics in near-potential games in
Section 4. In Section 5, we extend our analysis to logit response, and focus on the stationary
distribution and stochastically stable stable states of logit response. We present the results
on fictitious play, and its extensions in Section 6. We close in Section 7 with concluding
remarks and future work.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we present the game-theoretic background that is relevant to our work.
Additionally, we introduce the closeness measure for games, which is used in the rest of the
paper.
2.1. Finite Strategic Form Games
Our focus in this paper is on finite strategic form games. A (noncooperative) finite game
in strategic form consists of:
• A finite set of players, denoted by M = {1, . . . ,M}.
• Strategy spaces: A finite set of strategies (or actions) Em, for every m ∈M.
• Utility functions: um : ∏k∈MEk → R, for every m ∈M.
7
We denote a (strategic form) game instance by the tuple 〈M, {Em}m∈M, {um}m∈M〉, and
the joint strategy space of this game instance by E =
∏
m∈ME
m. We refer to a collection
of strategies of all players as a strategy profile and denote it by p = (p1, . . . , pM) ∈ E. The
collection of strategies of all players but the mth one is denoted by p−m.
The basic solution concept in a noncooperative game is that of a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile from which no player can unilaterally deviate
and improve its payoff. Formally, p is a Nash equilibrium if
um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m) ≤ 0,
for every qm ∈ Em and m ∈M.
To address strategy profiles that are approximately a Nash equilibrium, we use the con-
cept of -equilibrium. A strategy profile p , (p1, . . . , pM) is an -equilibrium ( ≥ 0) if
um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m) ≤ 
for every qm ∈ Em and m ∈M. We denote the set of -equilibria in a game G by X. Note
that a Nash equilibrium is an -equilibrium with  = 0.
2.2. Potential Games
We next describe a particular class of games that is central in this paper, the class of
potential games (Monderer and Shapley 1996b).
Definition 2.1 (Potential Game). A potential game is a noncooperative game for which
there exists a function φ : E → R satisfying
um(pm,p−m)− um(qm,p−m) = φ(pm,p−m)− φ(qm,p−m), (1)
for every m ∈ M, pm, qm ∈ Em, p−m ∈ E−m. The function φ is referred to as a potential
function of the game.
This definition ensures that the change in the utility of a player who unilaterally deviates
to a new strategy, coincides exactly with the corresponding change in the potential function.
Extensions of this definition in which equation (1) holds when each utility function is mul-
tiplied with a (possibly different) positive weight, or changes in utility and potential only
agree in sign, give rise to weighted and ordinal potential games that share similar properties
to potential games. We briefly discuss some of these extensions in Section 3. However, our
main focus in this paper is on potential games in Definition 2.1.
Some properties that are specific to potential games are evident from the definition. For
instance, it can be seen that unilateral deviations from a strategy profile that maximizes the
potential function (weakly) decrease the utility of the deviating player. Hence, this strategy
profile corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, and it follows that every potential game has a
pure Nash equilibrium.
Another important property of potential games, which will be used for characterizing
the limiting behavior of dynamics in near-potential games, is that the total unilateral utility
improvement around a “closed path” is equal to zero. Before we formally state this result,
we first provide some necessary definitions, which are also used in Section 4 when we analyze
better/best response dynamics in near-potential games.
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Definition 2.2 (Path – Closed Path – Improvement Path). A path is a collection of strategy
profiles γ = (p0, . . .pN) such that pi and pi+1 differ in the strategy of exactly one player. A
path is a closed path (or a cycle) if p0 = pN . A path is an improvement path if u
mi(pi) ≥
umi(pi−1) where mi is the player who modifies its strategy when the strategy profile is updated
from pi−1 to pi.
The transition from strategy profile pi−1 to pi is referred to as step i of the path. The
length of a path is equal to its number of steps, i.e., the length of the path γ = (p0, . . . ,pN)
is N . We say that a closed path is simple if no strategy profile other than the first and the
last strategy profiles is repeated along the path. For any path γ = (p0, . . . ,pN) let I(γ)
represent the total utility improvement along the path, i.e.,
I(γ) =
N∑
i=1
umi(pi)− umi(pi−1),
where mi is the index of the player that modifies its strategy in the ith step of the path.
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which a given
game is a potential game.
Proposition 2.1 (Monderer and Shapley (1996b)). A game is a potential game if and only
if I(γ) = 0 for all simple closed paths γ.
We conclude this section by formally defining the measure of “closeness” of games, used
in the subsequent sections.
Definition 2.3 (Maximum Pairwise Difference). Let G and Gˆ be two games with set of
players M, set of strategy profiles E, and collections of utility functions {um}m∈M and
{uˆm}m∈M respectively. The maximum pairwise difference (MPD) between these games is
defined as
d(G, Gˆ) 4= max
p∈E,m∈M,qm∈Em
∣∣(um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m))− (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m))∣∣ .
Note that the pairwise difference um(qm,p−m)−um(pm,p−m) quantifies how much player
m can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from strategy profile (pm,p−m) to strategy
profile (qm,p−m). Thus, the MPD captures how different two games are in terms of the utility
improvements due to unilateral deviations.3 We refer to pairs of games with small MPD as
close games, and games that have a small MPD to a potential game as near-potential games.
3An alternative distance measure can be given by
d2(G, Gˆ) 4=
∑
p∈E
∑
m∈M,qm∈Em
((
um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m))− (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m)))2
 12 ,
and this quantity corresponds to the 2-norm of the difference of G and Gˆ in terms of the utility improvements
due to unilateral deviations. Our analysis of the limiting behavior of dynamics relies on the maximum of
such utility improvement differences between a game and a near-potential game. Thus, the measure in
Definition 2.3 provides tighter bounds for our dynamics results, and hence is preferred in this paper.
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The MPD measures the closeness of games in terms of the difference of unilateral devia-
tions, rather than the difference of their utility functions, i.e., quantities of the form∣∣(um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m))− (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m))∣∣
are used to identify close games, rather than quantities of the form |um(pm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m)|.
This is because the difference in unilateral deviations provides a better characterization of
the strategic similarities (equilibrium and dynamic properties) between two games than the
difference in utility functions. This can be seen from the following example: Consider two
games with utility functions {um} and {um + 1}, i.e., in the second game players receive an
additional payoff of 1 at all strategy profiles. It can be seen from the definition of Nash equi-
librium that despite the difference of their utility functions, these two games share the same
equilibrium set. Intuitively, since the additional payoff is obtained at all strategy profiles, it
does not affect any of the strategic considerations in the game. While the utility differences
between these games is nonzero, it can be seen that the MPD is equal to zero. Hence MPD
identifies a strategic equivalence between these games. The recent work Candogan et al.
(2011) contains a formal treatment of strategic equivalence and its implications for strategic
form games.
3. Finding Near-Potential Games
In this section, we present a framework for finding the closest potential game to a given
game, where the distance between the games is measured in terms of MPD. We formulate
the problem of identifying such a game as a convex optimization problem, and discuss the
extensions of this approach. We note that a procedure for finding near-potential games can
be found in Candogan et al. (2011) and Candogan et al. (2010b). In these works the distance
between games is measured in terms of a 2-norm. In this section we illustrate how similar
ideas can be used when the distance is measured in terms of MPD.
It can be seen from Proposition 2.1 that a game is a potential game if and only if it
satisfies linear equalities. This suggests that the set of potential games is convex4, i.e., if
G = 〈M, E, {um}m〉 and Gˆ = 〈M, E, {uˆm}m〉 are potential games, then Gα = 〈M, E, {αum+
(1− α)uˆm}m〉, is also a potential game provided that α ∈ [0, 1].
Assume that a game with utility functions {um}m is given. The closest potential game
(in terms of MPD) to this game, with payoff functions {uˆm}m, and potential function φ can
4A game is a weighted potential game if (1) in Definition 2.1 is replaced by
φ(pm,p−m)− φ(qm,p−m) = wm (um(pm,p−m)− um(qm,p−m)) ,
for some positive player-specific weights {wm}. If instead of holding with equality, the left and right hand
sides of (1) only agree in sign, then the game is referred to as an ordinal potential game (Monderer and
Shapley 1996b). Despite the fact that weighted and ordinal potential games have similar desirable properties
to potential games, their sets are nonconvex, and finding the closest weighted/ordinal potential game to a
given game requires solving a nonconvex optimization problem (Candogan et al. 2010b).
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be obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
(P :)
min
φ,{uˆm}m
max
p∈E,m∈M,qm∈Em
∣∣(um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m))
− (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m))∣∣
s.t. φ(q¯m, p¯−m)− φ(p¯m, p¯−m) = uˆm(q¯m, p¯−m)− uˆm(p¯m, p¯−m),
for all m ∈M, p¯ ∈ E, q¯m ∈ Em.
Note that the difference (um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m)) − (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m)) is
linear in {uˆm}m. Thus, the objective function is the maximum of such linear functions, and
hence is convex in {uˆm}m. The constraints of this optimization problem guarantee that the
game with payoff functions {uˆm}m is a potential game with potential φ. Note that these
constrains are linear. Therefore, it follows that (P) is a convex optimization problem that
gives the closest potential game to a given game.
Let G1 and G2 be games with utility functions {um}m and {wmum}m respectively, where
for all m ∈ M, wm ≥ 1 is a fixed weight. It can be seen that preferences of play-
ers are identical in these two games, i.e., um(xm, x−m) − um(ym, x−m) > 0 if and only if
wmum(xm, x−m) − wmum(ym, x−m) > 0 for any m ∈ M, ym ∈ ∆Em and x ∈ ∏k∈M∆Ek.
Thus, it follows that the equilibrium sets of these game are the same, and for many of the
update rules in games5, such as better/best response dynamics, and fictitious play (but not
logit response), the trajectories of dynamics in G1 and G2 are identical.
This observation suggests that it may also be of interest to find a close potential game
to a “scaled version” of a given game. The following optimization formulation obtains such
a potential game:
(P2 :)
min
φ,{uˆm}m,{wm}m
max
p∈E,m∈M,qm∈Em
∣∣wm (um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m))
− (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m))∣∣
s.t. wm ≥ 1 for all m ∈M,
φ(q¯m, p¯−m)− φ(p¯m, p¯−m) = uˆm(q¯m, p¯−m)− uˆm(p¯m, p¯−m),
for all m ∈M, p¯ ∈ E, q¯m ∈ Em.
The solution of (P2) is a potential game with utility functions {uˆm}m. Comparing (P) and
(P2) it can be seen that (P2) obtains the closest potential game6 (in terms of MPD) to the
game with utility functions {wmum}m. Since (P2) also minimizes the objective function over
{wm}, the solution also reveals the “scaling” of the original game, which makes it as close
as possible to a potential game.
5For formal definitions of these update rules see Sections 4, 5, 6.
6Note that the solution of (P2) is not the closest weighted potential game to the original game. Such a
game can be obtained by replacing the objective function by
max
p∈E,m∈M,qm∈Em
∣∣(um(qm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m))− wm (uˆm(qm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m))∣∣ .
However, this objective function leads to a nonconvex optimization formulation due to the multiplication of
the terms wm and uˆm, and the solution of this problem is different than that of (P2). See Candogan et al.
(2010b) for details.
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In the rest of the paper, we do not discuss how a close potential game to a given game is
obtained, but we just assume that a close potential game with potential φ is known and the
MPD between this game and the original game is δ. We provide characterization results on
limiting dynamics for a given game in terms of φ and δ.
4. Better Response and Best Response Dynamics
In this section, we consider better and best response dynamics, and study convergence
properties of these update rules in near-potential games. All of the update rules considered in
this section are discrete-time update rules, i.e., players are allowed to update their strategies
at time instants t ∈ Z+ = {1, 2, . . . }.
Best response dynamics is an update rule where at each time instant a player chooses its
best response to other players’ current strategy profile. In better response dynamics, on the
other hand, players choose strategies that improve their payoffs, but these strategies need
not be their best responses. Formal descriptions of these update rules are given below.
Definition 4.1 (Better and Best Response Dynamics). At each time instant t ∈ {1, 2, . . . },
a single player is chosen at random for updating its strategy, using a probability distribution
with full support over the set of players. Let m be the player chosen at some time t, and let
r ∈ E denote the strategy profile that is used at time t− 1.
1. Better response dynamics is the update process where player m does not modify its strat-
egy if um(r) = maxqm u
m(qm, r−m), and otherwise it updates its strategy to a strategy
in {qm|um(qm, r−m) > um(r)}, chosen uniformly at random.
2. Best response dynamics is the update process where player m does not modify its strat-
egy if um(r) = maxqm u
m(qm, r−m), and otherwise it updates its strategy to a strategy
in arg maxqm u
m(qm, r−m), chosen uniformly at random.
For simplicity of the analysis, we assume here that users are chosen randomly to update
their strategy. However, this assumption is not crucial for our results, and can be relaxed.
We refer to strategies in arg maxqm u
m(qm, r−m) as best responses of player m to r−m. We
denote the strategy profile used at time t by pt, and we define the trajectory of the dynamics
as the sequence of strategy profiles {pt}∞t=0. In our analysis, we assume that the trajectory
is initialized at a strategy profile p0 ∈ E at time 0 and it evolves according to one of the
update rules described above.
The following theorem establishes that in finite games, better and best response dynamics
converge to a set of -equilibria, where the size of this set is characterized by the MPD to a
close potential game.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a nearby potential game such that d(G, Gˆ) ≤
δ. Assume that best response or better response dynamics are used in G, and denote the
number of strategy profiles in these games by |E| = h.
For both update processes, the trajectories are contained in the δh-equilibrium set of G
after finite time with probability 1, i.e., let T be a random variable such that pt ∈ Xδh, for
all t > T , then P (T <∞) = 1.
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Proof. We prove the claim by modeling the update process using a Markov chain, and
employing the improvement path condition for potential games (cf. Proposition 2.1).
Using Definition 4.1, we can represent the strategy updates in best response dynamics as
the state transitions in the following Markov chain: (i) Each state corresponds to a strategy
profile and, (ii) there is a nonzero transition probability from state r to state q 6= r, if r and
q differ in the strategy of a single player, say m, and qm is a (strict) best response of player
m to r−m. The probability of transition from state r to state q is equal to the probability
that at strategy profile r, player m is chosen for update and it chooses qm as its new strategy.
In the case of better response dynamics we allow qm to be any strategy strictly improving
payoff of player m, and a similar Markov chain representation still holds.
Since there are finitely many states, one of the recurrent classes of the Markov chain is
reached in finite time (with probability 1). Thus, to prove the claim, it is sufficient to show
that any state which belongs to some recurrent class of this Markov chain is contained in
the -equilibrium set of G.
It follows from Definition 4.1 that a recurrence class is a singleton, only if none of the
players can strictly improve its payoff by unilaterally deviating from the corresponding strat-
egy profile. Thus, such a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of G and is contained in the
-equilibrium set.
Consider a recurrence class that is not a singleton. Let r be a strategy profile in this
recurrence class. Since the recurrence class is not a singleton, there exists some player m,
who can unilaterally deviate from r by following its best response to another strategy profile
q, and increase its payoff by some α > 0. Since such a transition occurs with nonzero
probability, r and q are in the same recurrence class, and the process when started from r
visits q and returns to r in finitely many updates. Since each transition corresponds to a
unilateral deviation that strictly improves the payoff of the deviating player, this constitutes
a simple closed improvement path containing r and q. Let γ = (p0, . . . ,pN) be such an
improvement path and p0 = pN = r, p1 = q and N ≤ |E| = h. Since um(q) − um(r) = α,
and umi(pi) − umi(pi−1) ≥ 0 at every step i of the path, this closed improvement path
satisfies
N∑
i=1
(umi(pi)− umi(pi−1)) ≥ α. (2)
On the other hand it follows by Proposition 2.1 that the close potential game satisfies
N∑
i=1
(uˆmi(pi)− uˆmi(pi−1)) = 0. (3)
Combining (2) and (3) we conclude that
α ≤
N∑
i=1
(umi(pi)− umi(pi−1))− (uˆmi(pi)− uˆmi(pi−1))
≤ Nδ.
Since N ≤ |E| = h, it follows that α ≤ δh. The claim then immediately follows since
r and the recurrence class were chosen arbitrarily, and our analysis shows that the payoff
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improvement of player m (chosen for strategy update using a probability distribution with
full support as described in Definition 4.1), due to its best response is bounded by δh.
As can be seen from the proof of this theorem, extending dynamical properties of potential
games to nearby games relies on special structural properties of potential games. As a
corollary of the above theorem, we obtain that trajectories generated by better and best
response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium in potential games, since if G is a potential
game, the close potential game Gˆ can be chosen such that d(G, Gˆ) = 0.
5. Logit Response Dynamics
In this section we focus on logit response dynamics. Logit response dynamics can be
viewed as a smoothened version of the best response dynamics, in which a smoothing pa-
rameter determines the frequency with which the best response strategy is picked. The
evolution of the pure strategy profiles can be represented in terms of a Markov chain (with
state space given by the set of pure strategy profiles). We characterize the stationary dis-
tribution and stochastically stable states of this Markov chain (or of the update rule) in
near-potential games. Our approach involves identifying a close potential game to a given
game, and exploiting features of the corresponding potential function to characterize the
limiting behavior of logit response dynamics in the original game.
In Section 5.1, we provide a formal definition of logit response dynamics and review some
of its properties. We also present some of the mathematical tools used in the literature to
study this update rule. In Section 5.2, we show that the stationary distribution of logit
response dynamics in a near-potential game can be approximately characterized using the
potential function of a nearby potential game. We also use this result to show that the
stochastically stable strategy profiles are contained in approximate equilibrium sets in near-
potential games.
5.1. Properties of Logit Response
We start by providing a formal definition of logit response dynamics:
Definition 5.1. At each time instant t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, a single player is chosen at random for
updating its strategy, using a probability distribution with full support over the set of players.
Let m be the player chosen at some time t, and let r ∈ E denote the strategy profile that is
used at time t− 1.
Logit response dynamics with parameter τ is the update process, where player m chooses
a strategy qm ∈ Em with probability
Pmτ (q
m|r) = e
1
τ
um(qm,r−m)∑
pm∈Em e
1
τ
um(pm,r−m)
.
In this definition, τ > 0 is a fixed parameter that determines how often players choose
their best responses. The probability of not choosing a best response decreases as τ decreases,
and as τ → 0, players choose their best responses with probability 1. This feature suggests
that logit response dynamics can be viewed as a generalization of best response dynamics,
where with small but nonzero probability players use a strategy that is not a best response.
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For a given τ > 0, this update process can be represented by a finite aperiodic and
irreducible Markov chain (Marden and Shamma 2008, Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer 2010). The
states of the Markov chain correspond to the strategy profiles in the game. Denoting the
probability that player m is chosen for a strategy update by αm, transition probability from
strategy profile p to q can be given by (assuming p 6= q, and denoting the transition from
p to q by p→ q):
Pτ (p→ q) =
{
αmP
m
τ (q
m|p) if q−m = p−m for some m ∈M
0 otherwise.
(4)
The chain is aperiodic and irreducible since a player updating its strategy can choose any
strategy (including the current one) with positive probability. Consequently, it has a unique
stationary distribution.
We denote the stationary distribution of this Markov chain by µτ and refer to it as
the stationary distribution of the logit response dynamics. A strategy profile q such that
limτ→0 µτ (q) > 0 is referred to as a stochastically stable strategy profile of the logit response
dynamics. Intuitively, these strategy profiles are the ones that are used with nonzero prob-
ability, as players adopt their best responses more and more frequently in their strategy
updates.
In potential games, the stationary distribution of the logit response dynamics can be
written as an explicit function of the potential. If G is a potential game with potential func-
tion φ, the stationary distribution of the logit response dynamics is given by the distribution
(Marden and Shamma 2008, Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer 2010, Blume 1997):7
µτ (q) =
e
1
τ
φ(q)∑
p∈E e
1
τ
φ(p)
. (5)
It can be seen from (5) that limτ→0 µτ (q) > 0 if and only if q ∈ arg maxp∈E φ(p). Thus,
in potential games the stochastically stable strategy profiles are those that maximize the
potential function.
We next describe a method for obtaining the stationary distribution of Markov chains.
This method will be used in the next subsection in characterizing the stationary distribution
of logit response. Assume that an irreducible Markov chain over a finite set of states S, with
transition probability matrix P is given. Consider a directed tree, T , with nodes given by
the states of the Markov chain, and assume that an edge from node q to node p can exist
only if there is a nonzero transition probability from q to p in the Markov chain. We say
that the tree is rooted at state p, if from every state q 6= p there exists a unique directed
path along the tree to p. For each state p ∈ S, denote by T (p) the set of all trees rooted at
p, and define a weight wp ≥ 0 such that
wp =
∑
T∈T (p)
∏
(q→r)∈T
P (q→ r). (6)
7Note that this expression is independent of {αm}, i.e., the probability distribution that is used to choose
which player updates its strategy has no effect on the stationary distribution of logit response.
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The following proposition from the Markov Chain literature (Leighton and Rivest (1983),
Anantharam and Tsoucas (1989), Freidlin and Wentzell (1998)), known as the Markov chain
tree theorem, expresses the stationary distribution of Markov chains in terms of these weights.
Proposition 5.1. The stationary distribution of the Markov chain defined over set S is
given by µ(p) = wp∑
q∈S wq
.
For any T ∈ T (p), intuitively, the quantity ∏(q→r)∈T P (q → r) gives a measure of
likelihood of the event that node p is reached when the chain is initiated from the leaves
(i.e., nodes with indegree equal to 0) of T . Thus, wp captures how likely it is that node
p is visited in this chain, and the normalization in Proposition 5.1 gives the stationary
distribution. Since for finite games logit response dynamics can be modeled as an irreducible
Markov chain, this result can be used to characterize its stationary distribution.
5.2. Stationary Distribution of Logit Response Dynamics
In this section we show that the stationary distribution of logit response dynamics in near-
potential games can be approximated by exploiting the potential function of a close potential
game. We start by showing that in games with small MPD logit response dynamics have
similar transition probabilities.
Lemma 5.1. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a nearby potential game such that d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ.
Denote the transition probability matrices of logit response dynamics in G and Gˆ by Pτ and
Pˆτ respectively. For all strategy profiles p and q that differ in the strategy of at most one
player, we have
e−
2δ
τ ≤ Pˆτ (p→ q)/Pτ (p→ q) ≤ e 2δτ .
Proof. Assume that p−m = q−m. In G the transition probability Pτ (p→ q) can be expressed
by (see (4)):
Pτ (p→ q) =

αmP
m
τ (q
m|p) if qm 6= pm∑
k∈M
αkP
k
τ (p
k|p) otherwise.
A similar expression holds for the transition probability Pˆτ (p → q) in Gˆ, replacing Pmτ by
Pˆmτ . Thus, it is sufficient prove e
− 2δ
τ ≤ Pˆmτ (qm|p)/Pmτ (qm|p) ≤ e
2δ
τ for all p, m, qm to prove
the claim.
Observe that by the definition of MPD
um(rm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m)− δ ≤ uˆm(rm,p−m)− uˆm(pm,p−m)
≤ um(rm,p−m)− um(pm,p−m) + δ. (7)
Definition 5.1 suggests that Pˆmτ (q
m|p) can be written as (by dividing the numerator and the
denominator by e
1
τ
uˆm(pm,p−m)):
Pˆmτ (q
m|p) = e
1
τ
(uˆm(qm,p−m)−uˆm(pm,p−m))∑
rm∈Em e
1
τ
(uˆm(rm,p−m)−uˆm(pm,p−m)) .
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Therefore, using the bounds in (7) it follows that
Pˆmτ (q
m|p) ≤ κ(q
m)e
δ
τ
κ(qm)e
δ
τ +
∑
rm 6=qm κ(r
m)e
−δ
τ
.
where, κ(rm) = e
1
τ
(um(rm,p−m)−um(pm,p−m)) for all rm ∈ Em. Dividing both the numerator and
the denominator of the right hand side by
∑
rm∈Em κ(r
m) and observing that Pmτ (q
m|p) =
κ(qm)∑
rm∈Em κ(rm)
, we obtain
Pˆmτ (q
m|p) ≤ e
δ
τ Pmτ (q
m|p)
e
δ
τ Pmτ (q
m|p) + e− δτ (1− Pmτ (qm|p))
,
or equivalently
Pˆmτ (q
m|p)
Pmτ (q
m|p) ≤
e
δ
τ
e
δ
τ Pmτ (q
m|p) + e− δτ (1− Pmτ (qm|p))
.
It can be seen that the right hand side is decreasing in Pmτ (q
m|p). Thus replacing Pmτ (qm|p)
by 0, the right hand side can be upper bounded by e
2δ
τ . Then we obtain Pˆmτ (q
m|p)/Pmτ (qm|p) ≤
e
2δ
τ . By symmetry we also conclude that Pmτ (q
m|p)/Pˆmτ (qm|p) ≤ e
2δ
τ , and combining these
bounds the claim follows.
Definition 5.1 suggests that perturbation of utility functions changes the transition prob-
abilities multiplicatively in logit response. The above lemma supports this intuition: if utility
gains due to unilateral deviations are modified by δ, the ratio of the transition probabilities
can change at most by e
2δ
τ . Thus, if two games are close, then the transition probabilities of
logit response in these games should be closely related.
This suggests using results from perturbation theory of Markov chains to characterize the
stationary distribution of logit response in a near-potential game (Haviv and Van der Heyden
1984, Cho and Meyer 2001). However, standard perturbation results characterize changes in
the stationary distribution of a Markov chain when the transition probabilities are additively
perturbed. These results, when applied to multiplicative perturbations, yield bounds which
are uninformative. We therefore first present a result which characterizes deviations from the
stationary distribution of a Markov chain when its transition probabilities are multiplicatively
perturbed, and therefore may be of independent interest.8
Theorem 5.1. Let P and Pˆ denote the probability transition matrices of two finite irreducible
Markov chains with the same state space. Denote the stationary distributions of these Markov
chains by µ and µˆ respectively, and let the cardinality of the state space be h. Assume that
α ≥ 1 is a given constant and for any two states p and q, the following inequalities hold
α−1P (p→ q) ≤ Pˆ (p→ q) ≤ αP (p→ q).
8A multiplicative perturbation bound similar to ours, can be found in Freidlin and Wentzell (1998).
However, this bound is looser than the one we obtain and it does not provide a good characterization of the
stationary distribution in our setting. We provide a tighter bound, and obtain stronger predictions on the
stationary distribution of logit response.
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Then, for any state p, we have
(i)
α−(h−1)µ(p)
α−(h−1)µ(p) + αh−1(1− µ(p)) ≤ µˆ(p) ≤
αh−1µ(p)
αh−1µ(p) + α−(h−1)(1− µ(p)) ,
(ii) |µ(p)− µˆ(p)| ≤ α
h−1 − 1
αh−1 + 1
.
Proof. As before, let T (p) denote the set of directed trees that are rooted at state p. Using
the characterization of the stationary distribution in Proposition 5.1, for the Markov chain
with probability transition matrix P , we have µ(p) = wp∑
q wq
, where for each state p,
wp =
∑
T∈T (p)
∏
(x→y)∈T
P (x→ y).
For the Markov chain with probability transition matrix Pˆ , we define wˆp, by replacing P in
the above equation with Pˆ and µˆ(p) similarly satisfies µˆ(p) = wˆp∑
q wˆq
.
Since the Markov chain has h states, |T | = h−1 for all T ∈ T (p). Hence, it follows from
the assumption of the theorem and the above definitions of wp and wˆp that
α−(h−1)wp = α−(h−1)
∑
T∈T (p)
∏
(x→y)∈T
P (x→ y)
≤ wˆp =
∑
T∈T (p)
∏
(x→y)∈T
Pˆ (x→ y)
≤ αh−1
∑
T∈T (p)
∏
(x→y)∈T
P (x→ y) = αh−1wp.
This inequality implies that for all q, wˆq is upper bounded by α
h−1wq and lower bounded
by α−(h−1)wq. Using this observation together with the identity µˆ(p) =
wˆp∑
q wˆq
, we obtain
α−(h−1)wp
α−(h−1)wp + αh−1
∑
q 6=pwq
≤ µˆ(p) = wˆp∑
q wˆq
≤ α
h−1wp
αh−1wp + α−(h−1)
∑
q 6=pwq
.
Dividing the numerators and denominators of the left and right hand sides of the inequality
by
∑
qwq, using Proposition 5.1, and observing that
∑
q 6=p µ(q) = 1−µ(p) the first part of
the theorem follows.
Consider functions f and g defined on [0, 1] such that f(x) = α
h−1x
αh−1x+α−(h−1)(1−x) − x and
g(x) = α
−(h−1)x
α−(h−1)x+αh−1(1−x) − x for x ∈ [0, 1]. Checking the first order optimality conditions,
it can be seen that f(x) is maximized at x = α
−(h−1)
1+α−(h−1) , and the maximum equals to
αh−1−1
αh−1+1 .
Similarly, the minimum of g(x) is achieved at x = α
h−1
1+αh−1 and is equal to
1−αh−1
1+αh−1 . Combining
these observations with part (i), we obtain
1− αh−1
1 + αh−1
≤ g(µ(p)) = α
−(h−1)µ(p)
α−(h−1)µ(p) + αh−1(1− µ(p)) − µ(p) ≤ µˆ(p)− µ(p)
≤ α
h−1µ(p)
αh−1µ(p) + α−(h−1)(1− µ(p)) − µ(p) = f(µ(p)) ≤
αh−1 − 1
αh−1 + 1
,
hence the second part of the claim follows.
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Next we use the above theorem to relate the stationary distributions of logit response
dynamics in nearby games.
Corollary 5.1. Let G and Gˆ be finite games with number of strategy profiles |E| = h, such
that d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ. Denote the stationary distributions of logit response dynamics in these
games by µτ , and µˆτ respectively. Then, for any strategy profile p we have
(i)
e−
2δ(h−1)
τ µτ (p)
e−
2δ(h−1)
τ µτ (p) + e
2δ(h−1)
τ (1− µτ (p))
≤ µˆτ (p) ≤ e
2δ(h−1)
τ µτ (p)
e
2δ(h−1)
τ µτ (p) + e
− 2δ(h−1)
τ (1− µτ (p))
,
(ii) |µτ (p)− µˆτ (p)| ≤ e
2δ(h−1)
τ − 1
e
2δ(h−1)
τ + 1
.
Proof. Proof follows from Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.1 by setting α = e
2δ
τ .
The above corollary can be adapted to near-potential games, by exploiting the relation of
stationary distribution of logit response and potential function in potential games (see (5)).
We conclude this section by providing such a characterization of the stationary distribution
of logit response dynamics in near-potential games.
Corollary 5.2. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a nearby potential game such that d(G, Gˆ) ≤
δ. Denote the potential function of Gˆ by φ, and the number of strategy profiles in these games
by |E| = h. Then, the stationary distribution µτ of logit response dynamics in G is such that
(i)
e
1
τ
(φ(p)−2δ(h−1))
e
1
τ
(φ(p)−2δ(h−1)) +
∑
q 6=p∈E e
1
τ
(φ(q)+2δ(h−1)) ≤ µτ (p)
≤ e
1
τ
(φ(p)+2δ(h−1))
e
1
τ
(φ(p)+2δ(h−1)) +
∑
q6=p∈E e
1
τ
(φ(q)−2δ(h−1)) ,
(ii)
∣∣∣∣∣µτ (p)− e
1
τ
φ(p)∑
q∈E e
1
τ
φ(q)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ e
2δ(h−1)
τ − 1
e
2δ(h−1)
τ + 1
.
Proof. Proof follows from Corollary 5.1 and (5).
With simple manipulations, it can be shown that (ex−1)/(ex+1) ≤ x/2 for x ≥ 0. Thus,
(ii) in the above corollary implies that
∣∣∣∣µτ (p)− e 1τ φ(p)∑
q∈E e
1
τ φ(q)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ(h−1)τ . Therefore, the station-
ary distribution of logit response dynamics in a near-potential game can be characterized in
terms of the stationary distribution of this update rule in a close potential game. When τ
is fixed and δ → 0, i.e., when the original game is arbitrarily close to a potential game, the
stationary distribution of logit response is arbitrarily close to the stationary distribution in
the potential game. On the other hand, for a fixed δ, as τ → 0, the upper bound in (ii)
becomes uninformative. This is the case since τ → 0 implies that players adopt their best
responses with probability 1, and thus the stationary distribution of the update rule becomes
very sensitive to the difference of the game from a potential game. In this case we can still
characterize the stochastically stable states of logit response using the results of Corollary
5.2, as we show in Corollary 5.3.
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Corollary 5.3. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a nearby potential game with potential
function φ and d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ. Denote the potential function of Gˆ by φ, and the number of
strategy profiles in these games by |E| = h. The stochastically stable strategy profiles of G
are (i) contained in S = {p|φ(p) ≥ maxq φ(q)− 4δ(h− 1)}, (ii) 4δh-equilibria of G.
Proof. (i) The upper bound in the first part of Corollary 5.2 implies that if p is a strategy
profile such that φ(p) < maxq∈E φ(q) − 4δ(h − 1), then the stationary distribution of logit
response in G is such that µτ (p) → 0 as τ → 0. Thus, it immediately follows that the
stochastically stable states in G are contained in {p ∈ E|φ(p) ≥ maxq∈E φ(q)− 4δ(h− 1)}.
(ii) From the definition of S it follows that in Gˆ, none of the players can deviate from
a strategy profile in S and improve its utility by more than 4δ(h − 1). Since d(G, Gˆ) ≤
δ it follows from part (i) that in G, none of the players can unilaterally deviate from a
stochastically stable strategy profile and improve its utility by more than 4δ(h−1)+δ ≤ 4δh.
Hence stochastically stable strategy profiles of G are 4δh-equilibria.
We conclude that in near-potential games, the stochastically stable states of logit re-
sponse are the strategy profiles that approximately maximize the potential function of a
close potential game. This result enables us to characterize the stochastically stable states
of logit response dynamics in near-potential games, without explicitly computing the sta-
tionary distribution.
6. Fictitious Play
In this section, we investigate the convergence behavior of fictitious play in near-potential
games. Unlike better/best response dynamics and logit response, in fictitious play agents
maintain an empirical frequency distribution of other players’ strategies and play a best
response against it. Thus, analyzing fictitious play dynamics requires the notion of mixed
strategies and some additional definitions that are provided in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2
we show that in finite games the empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge to a set
which can be characterized in terms of the approximate equilibrium set of the game and
the level sets of the potential function of a close potential game. When the original game
is sufficiently close to a potential game, we strengthen this result and establish that the
empirical frequencies converge to a small neighborhood of mixed equilibria of the game,
and the size of this neighborhood is a function of the distance of the original game from a
potential game. As a special case, our result allows us to recover the result of Monderer and
Shapley (1996a), which states that in potential games the empirical frequencies of fictitious
play converge to the set of mixed Nash equilibria.
6.1. Mixed Strategies and Equilibria
In this section, we introduce some additional notation and definitions, which will be
used in Section 6.2 when studying convergence properties of fictitious play in near-potential
games.
We start by introducing the concept of mixed strategies in games. For each player
m ∈ M, we denote by ∆Em the set of probability distributions on Em. For xm ∈ ∆Em,
xm(pm) denotes the probability player m assigns to strategy pm ∈ Em. We refer to the
distribution xm ∈ ∆Em as a mixed strategy of player m ∈ M and to the collection x =
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{xm}m∈M ∈
∏
m ∆E
m as a mixed strategy profile. The mixed strategy profile of all players
but the mth one is denoted by x−m. We use ||·|| to denote the standard 2-norm on∏m ∆Em,
i.e., for x ∈∏m ∆Em, we have ||x||2 = ∑m∈M∑pm∈Em (xm(pm))2.
By slight (but standard) abuse of notation, we use the same notation for the mixed
extension of utility function um of player m ∈M, i.e.,
um(x) =
∑
p∈E
um(p)
∏
k∈M
xk(pk), (8)
for all x ∈∏m ∆Em. In addition, if player m uses some pure strategy qm and other players
use the mixed strategy profile x−m, the payoff of player m is denoted by
um(qm,x−m) =
∑
p−m∈E−m
um(qm,p−m)
∏
k∈M,k 6=m
xk(pk).
Similarly, we denote the mixed extension of the potential function by φ(x), and we use the
notation φ(qm,x−m) to denote the potential when player m uses some pure strategy qm and
other players use the mixed strategy profile x−m.
A mixed strategy profile x = {xm}m∈M ∈
∏
m ∆E
m is a mixed -equilibrium if for all
m ∈M and pm ∈ Em,
um(pm,x−m)− um(xm,x−m) ≤ . (9)
Note that if the inequality holds for  = 0, then x is referred to as a mixed Nash equilibrium
of the game. In the rest of the paper, we use the notation X to denote the set of mixed
-equilibria.
Our characterization of the limiting mixed strategy set of fictitious play depends on the
number of players in the game. We use M = |M| as a short-hand notation for this number.
We conclude this section with two technical lemmas which summarize some properties
of mixed equilibria and mixed extensions of potential and utility functions. Proofs of these
lemmas can be found in the Appendix.
The first lemma establishes the Lipschitz continuity of the mixed extensions of the payoff
functions and the potential function. It also shows a natural implication of continuity:
for any ′ > , a small enough neighborhood of the -equilibrium set is contained in the
′-equilibrium set.
Lemma 6.1. (i) Let ν :
∏
m∈ME
m → R be a mapping from pure strategy profiles to
real numbers. Its mixed extension is Lipschitz continuous with a Lipschitz constant of
M
∑
p∈E |ν(p)| over the domain
∏
m∈M∆E
m.
(ii) Let α ≥ 0 and γ > 0 be given. There exists a small enough θ > 0 such that for any
||x− y|| < θ if x ∈ Xα, then y ∈ Xα+γ.
Lipschitz continuity follows from the fact that mixed extensions are multilinear functions
(8), with bounded domains. The proof of the second part immediately follows from the
Lipschitz continuity of mixed extensions of payoff functions and the definition of approximate
equilibria (9). Note that the second part implies that for any ′ > 0, there exists a small
enough neighborhood of equilibria that is contained in the ′-equilibrium set of the game.
We next study the continuity properties of the approximate equilibrium mapping. We
first provide the relevant definitions (see Berge (1963), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
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Definition 6.1 (Upper Semicontinuous Function). A function g : X → Y ⊂ R is upper
semicontinuous at x∗, if, for each  > 0 there exists a neighborhood U of x∗, such that g(x) <
g(x∗) +  for all x ∈ U . We say g is upper semicontinuous, if it is upper semicontinuous at
every point in its domain.
Alternatively, g is upper semicontinuous if lim supxn→x∗ g(xn) ≤ g(x∗) for every x∗ in its
domain.
Definition 6.2 (Upper Semicontinuous Correspondence). A correspondence g : X ⇒ Y is
upper semicontinuous at x∗, if for any open neighborhood V of g(x∗) there exists a neighbor-
hood U of x∗ such that g(x) ⊂ V for all x ∈ U . We say g is upper semicontinuous, if it is
upper semicontinuous at every point in its domain and g(x) is a compact set for each x ∈ X.
Alternatively, when Y is compact, g is upper semicontinuous if its graph is closed, i.e.,
the set {(x, y)|x ∈ X, y ∈ g(x)} is closed.
We next establish upper semicontinuity of the approximate equilibrium mapping.9
Lemma 6.2. (i) Let ν :
∏
m∈M∆E
m → R be an upper semicontinuous function. The
correspondence g : R ⇒
∏
m∈M∆E
m such that g(v) = {x|ν(x) ≥ −v} is upper semi-
continuous.
(ii) Let g : R⇒
∏
m∈M∆E
m be the correspondence such that g(α) = Xα. This correspon-
dence is upper semicontinuous.
Upper semicontinuity of the approximate equilibrium mapping implies that for any given
neighborhood of the -equilibrium set, there exists an ′ >  such that ′-equilibrium set
is contained in this neighborhood. In particular, this implies that every neighborhood of
equilibria of the game contains an ′-equilibrium set for some ′ > 0. Hence, if disjoint neigh-
borhoods of equilibria are chosen (assuming there are finitely many equilibria), this implies
that there exists some ′ > 0, such that the ′-equilibrium set is contained in disjoint neigh-
borhoods of equilibria. In the next section, we use this observation to establish convergence
of fictitious play to small neighborhoods of equilibria of near-potential games.
6.2. Discrete-Time Fictitious Play
Fictitious play is a classical update rule studied in the learning in games literature. In
this section, we consider the fictitious play dynamics, proposed in Brown (1951), and explain
how the limiting behavior of this dynamical process can be characterized in near-potential
games. In particular, we show that the empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge to a
set which can be characterized in terms of the -equilibrium set of the game, and the level
sets of the potential function of a close potential game. We also establish that for games
sufficiently close to a potential game, the empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge
to a neighborhood of the (mixed) equilibrium set. Moreover, the size of this neighborhood
depends on the distance of the original game from a nearby potential game. This generalizes
9Here we fix the game, and discuss upper semicontinuity with respect to the  parameter characterizing
the -equilibrium set. We note that this is different than the common results in the literature which discuss
upper semicontinuity of the equilibrium set with respect to changes in the utility functions of the underlying
game (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
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the result of Monderer and Shapley (1996a), on convergence of empirical frequencies to mixed
Nash equilibria in potential games.
In this paper, we only consider the discrete-time version of fictitious play, i.e., the update
process starts at a given strategy profile at time t = 0, and players can update their strategies
at discrete time instants t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. Throughout this subsection we denote the strategy
used by player m at time instant t by pmt , and we denote by 1(p
m
t = p
m) the indicator
function which equals to 1 if pmt = p
m, and 0 otherwise. A formal definition of discrete-time
fictitious play dynamics is given next.
Definition 6.3 (Discrete-Time Fictitious Play). Let µmT (q
m) = 1
T
∑T−1
t=0 1(p
m
t = q
m) denote
the empirical frequency that player m uses strategy qm from time instant 0 to time instant
T − 1, and µ−mT denote the collection of empirical frequencies of all players but m. A game
play, where at each time instant t, every player m, chooses a strategy pmt such that
pmt ∈ arg max
qm∈Em
um(qm, µ−mt )
is referred to as discrete-time fictitious play. That is, fictitious play dynamics is the update
process, where each player chooses its best response to the empirical frequencies of the actions
of other players.
We refer to µmt as the distribution of empirical frequencies of player m’s strategies at
time t. Note that µmt can be thought of as vector with length |Em|, whose entries are
indexed by strategies of player m, i.e., µmt (p
m) denotes the entry of the vector corresponding
to the empirical frequency player m uses strategy pm with. Similarly, we define the joint
empirical frequency distribution of all players as µt = {µmt }m∈M. Note that µmt ∈ ∆Em, i.e.,
empirical frequency distributions are mixed strategies, and similarly µt ∈
∏
m∈M∆E
m.
Observe that the evolution of this empirical frequency distribution can be captured by
the following equation:
µt+1 =
t
t+ 1
µt +
1
t+ 1
It, (10)
where It = {Imt }m∈M, and Imt is a vector which has the same size as µmt and its entry
corresponding to strategy pm is given by Imt (p
m) = 1(pmt = p
m). Rearranging the terms in
(10), and observing that It, µt ∈
∏
m∈M∆E
m are vectors with entries in [0, 1] we conclude
||µt+1 − µt|| = 1
t+ 1
||It − µt|| = O
(
1
t
)
, (11)
where O(·) stands for the big-O notation, i.e., f(x) = O(g(x)), implies that there exists some
x0 and a constant c such that |f(x)| ≤ c|g(x)| for all x ≥ x0.
We start analyzing discrete-time fictitious play in near-potential games, by first focusing
on the change in the value of the potential function along the fictitious play updates in
the original game. In particular, we show that in near-potential games if the empirical
frequencies are outside some -equilibrium set, then the potential of the close potential game
(evaluated at the empirical frequency distribution) increases by discrete-time fictitious play
updates.10
10Our approach here is similar to the one used in Monderer and Shapley (1996a) to analyze discrete-time
fictitious play in potential games.
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Lemma 6.3. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a close potential game such that d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ.
Denote the potential function of Gˆ by φ. Assume that in G players update their strategies
according to discrete-time fictitious play dynamics, and at some time instant T > 0, the
empirical frequency distribution µT is outside an -equilibrium set of G. Then,
φ(µT+1)− φ(µT ) ≥ −Mδ
T + 1
+O
(
1
T 2
)
.
Proof. Consider the mixed extension of the potential function φ(x) =
∑
p∈E φ(p)
∏
m∈M x
m(pm),
where x = {xm}m and xm(pm) denotes the probability player m plays strategy pm. The ex-
pression for φ(x) implies that Taylor expansion of φ around µT satisfies
φ(µT+1) = φ(µT ) +
∑
m∈M
∑
pm∈Em
(µmT+1(p
m)− µmT (pm))φ(pm, µ−mT ) +O(||µT+1 − µT ||2).
Observing from (10) that µt+1 − µt = 1t+1(It − µt), and noting from (11) that ||µt+1 − µt|| =
O
(
1
t
)
the above equality can be rewritten as
φ(µT+1) = φ(µT ) +
∑
m∈M
∑
pm∈Em
1
T + 1
(1(pmT = p
m)− µmT (pm))φ(pm, µ−mT ) +O
(
1
T 2
)
.
Rearranging the terms, and noting that
∑
pm∈Em µ
m
T (p
m)φ(pm, µ−mT ) = φ(µ
m
T , µ
−m
T ), it follows
that
φ(µT+1) = φ(µT ) +
∑
m∈M
1
T + 1
φ(pmT , µ
−m
T )−
∑
m∈M
1
T + 1
φ(µmT , µ
−m
T ) +O
(
1
T 2
)
= φ(µT ) +
1
T + 1
∑
m∈M
(
φ(pmT , µ
−m
T )− φ(µmT , µ−mT )
)
+O
(
1
T 2
)
.
Since d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ, the above equality and the definition of MPD imply
φ(µT+1) ≥ φ(µT ) + 1
T + 1
∑
m∈M
(
um(pmT , µ
−m
T )− um(µmT , µ−mT )− δ
)
+O
(
1
T 2
)
. (12)
By definition of the fictitious play dynamics, every player m plays its best response to µ−mT ,
therefore um(pmT , µ
−m
T ) − um(µmT , µ−mT ) ≥ 0 for all m. Additionally, if µT is outside the
-equilibrium set, as in the statement of the lemma, then it follows that um(pmT , µ
−m
T ) −
um(µmT , µ
−m
T ) ≥  for at least one player. Therefore, (12) implies
φ(µT+1) ≥ φ(µT ) + −Mδ
T + 1
+O
(
1
T 2
)
,
hence, the claim follows.
The above theorem implies that if µT is not in the -equilibrium set for some  > Mδ,
and T sufficiently large, then the potential evaluated at empirical frequencies increases when
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players update their strategies. Since the mixed extension of the potential is a bounded
function, the potential cannot increase unboundedly, and this observation suggests that the
-equilibrium set is eventually reached by the empirical frequency distribution. On the other
hand, at a later time instant µT can still leave this equilibrium set, and before it does so the
potential cannot be lower than the lowest potential in this set (since µT itself belongs to this
set). Moreover, after µT leaves the -equilibrium set the potential keeps increasing. Thus, the
empirical frequencies are contained in the set of mixed strategy profiles, which have potential
at least as large as the minimum potential in this approximate equilibrium set. We next make
this intuition precise, and characterize the set of limiting mixed strategies for fictitious play
in near-potential games. We adopt the following convergence notion: we say that empirical
frequencies of fictitious play converge to a set S ⊂ ∏m∈M∆Em, if infx∈S ||µt − x|| → 0 as
t→∞.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a close potential game such that d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ.
Denote the potential function of Gˆ by φ. Assume that in G players update their strategies
according to discrete-time fictitious play dynamics, and let Xα denote the α-equilibrium set
of G. For any  > 0, there exists a time instant T > 0 such that for all t > T
µt ∈ C ,
{
x ∈
∏
m∈M
∆Em
∣∣∣∣∣φ(x) ≥ miny∈XMδ+ φ(y)
}
.
Proof. Let ′ be such that  > ′ > 0. It can be seen from the definition of C that XMδ+′ ⊂
XMδ+ ⊂ C. We prove the claim in two steps: (i) We first show that in this update
process XMδ+′ is visited infinitely often by µt, i.e., for all T ′, there exists t > T ′ such that
µt ∈ XMδ+′ , (ii) We prove that there exists a T ′′ such that if µt ∈ C for some t > T ′′,
then for all t′ > t we have µt′ ∈ C. Thus, the second step guarantees that if C is visited
at a sufficiently later time instant, then µt remains in C. Since XMδ+′ ⊂ C the first step
ensures that such a time instant exists, and the claim in the theorem immediately follows
from (ii). Moreover, this time instant corresponds to T in the theorem statement.
Proof of both steps rely on the following simple observation: Lemma 6.3 implies that
there exists a large enough T , such that if the empirical frequencies do not belong to XMδ+′
at a time instant t > T , then φ increases:
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥ Mδ + 
′ −Mδ
(t+ 1)
+O
(
1
t2
)
>
′
2(t+ 1)
> 0. (13)
We prove (i) by contradiction. Assume that there exists a T ′ such that µt /∈ XMδ+′ for
t > T ′, and let Tm = max{T, T ′}. Then, (13) holds for all t = {Tm + 1, . . . }, and summing
both sides of this inequality over this set we obtain
lim sup
t→∞
φ(µt+1)− φ(µTm+1) ≥
∞∑
t=Tm+1
′
2(t+ 1)
.
Since the mixed extension of the potential is a bounded function, it follows that the left
hand side of the above inequality is bounded, but the right hand side grows unboundedly.
Hence, we reach a contradiction, and (i) follows.
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Lemma 6.1 (ii) implies that there exists some θ > 0 such that if a strategy profile x
is an (Mδ + ′)-equilibrium, then any strategy profile y that satisfies ||x − y|| < θ is an
(Mδ + )-equilibrium (recall that  > ′ > 0). Since ||µt+1 − µt|| = O(1/t) by (11), this
implies that there exists some T ′′ > T , such that for all t > T ′′ if µt ∈ XMδ+′ , then we have
µt+1 ∈ XMδ+. (14)
Let µt ∈ C for some time instant t > T ′′. If µt ∈ XMδ+′ , then by (14) µt+1 ∈ XMδ+ ⊂ C.
If, on the other hand, µt ∈ C −XMδ+′ , then by (13) and the definition of C we have
φ(µt+1) > φ(µt) ≥ min
y∈XMδ+
φ(y), (15)
and hence µt+1 ∈ C. Thus, we have established that there exists some T ′′ such that if
µt ∈ C for some t > T ′′, then µt+1 ∈ C, and hence (ii) follows.
The above theorem establishes that after finite time µt is contained in the set C for any
 > 0. Corollary 6.1, establishes that in the limit this result can be strengthened: as t→∞,
µt converges to a set, which is a subset of C for every  > 0. The proof can be found in the
Appendix.
Corollary 6.1. The empirical frequencies of discrete-time fictitious play converge to
C ,
{
x ∈
∏
m∈M
∆Em
∣∣∣∣∣φ(x) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y)
}
.
This result suggests that in near-potential games, the empirical frequencies of fictitious
play converge to a set where the potential is at least as large as the minimum potential in
an approximate equilibrium set. For exact potential games, it is known that the empiri-
cal frequencies converge to a Nash equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley 1996a). It can be
seen from Definition 2.1 that in potential games, maximizers of the potential function are
equilibria of the game. Thus, in potential games with a unique equilibrium the equilibrium
is the unique maximizer of the potential function. Hence, for such games, we have δ = 0,
miny∈XMδ φ(y) = maxx∈
∏
m∈M∆Em φ(x), and Corollary 6.1 implies that empirical frequencies
of fictitious play converge to the unique equilibrium of the game, recovering the convergence
result of Monderer and Shapley (1996a). However, when there are multiple equilibria Corol-
lary 6.1 suggests that empirical frequencies converge to the set of mixed strategy profiles
that have potential weakly larger than the minimum potential attained by the equilibria.
While this set contains equilibria, it may contain a continuum of other mixed strategy pro-
files. This suggests that in games with multiple equilibria our result may provide a loose
characterization of the limiting behavior of fictitious play dynamics.
We next show that by exploiting the properties of mixed approximate equilibrium sets,
it is possible to obtain a stronger result. Before we present our result, we discuss a feature of
mixed equilibrium sets which will be key in our analysis: For small , the -equilibrium set
is contained in a small neighborhood of equilibria (this statement follows from Lemma 6.2
(ii) by considering the upper semicontinuity of the approximate equilibrium correspondence
g(α) at α = 0). This property is illustrated in Example 6.1.
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O F
O 3, 2 0, 0
F 0, 0 2, 3
Table 3: Payoffs in BoS.
Example 6.1 (Mixed equilibrium set of Battle of the Sexes:). Consider the two-player battle
of the sexes (BoS) game: Each player has two possible actions {O,F}, and the payoffs of
players are as given in Table 3. This game has three equilibria: (i) both players use O, (ii)
Both players use F , (iii) Row player uses O with probability 0.6, and column player uses O
with probability 0.4. Note that since this is a game where each player has only two strategies,
the probability of using strategy O, in the third case uniquely identifies the corresponding
mixed equilibrium. For different values of , the set of -equilibria of this game is shown
in Figure 4. It follows that the set of -equilibria is contained in disjoint neighborhoods of
equilibria for small values of .
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(a) 0.2-equilibrium set.
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(b) 0.3-equilibrium set.
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(c) 0.4-equilibrium set.
Figure 4: Approximate equilibrium sets in BoS are contained in disjoint neighborhoods of
equilibria for small .
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It was established in Lemma 6.3 that the potential function of a nearby potential game
(with MPD δ to the original game), evaluated at the empirical frequency distribution, in-
creases when this distribution is outside the Mδ-equilibrium set of the original game (where
M is the number of players). If δ is sufficiently small, then the Mδ-equilibria of the game
will be contained in a small neighborhood of the equilibria, as illustrated above and shown in
Lemma 6.2 (ii). Thus, for sufficiently small δ, it is possible to establish that the potential of
a close potential game increases outside a small neighborhood of the equilibria of the game.
In Theorem 6.2, we use this observation to show that for sufficiently small δ the empirical
frequencies of fictitious play dynamics converge to a neighborhood of an equilibrium. We
state the theorem under the assumption that the original game has finitely many equilibria.
This assumption generically holds, i.e., for any game a (nondegenerate) random perturbation
of payoffs will lead to such a game with probability one (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
When stating our result, we make use of the Lipschitz continuity of the mixed extension of
the potential function, as established in Lemma 6.1.
Theorem 6.2. Consider a game G and let Gˆ be a close potential game such that d(G, Gˆ) ≤ δ.
Denote the potential function of Gˆ by φ, and the Lipschitz constant of the mixed extension of
φ by L. Assume that G has finitely many equilibria, and in G players update their strategies
according to discrete-time fictitious play dynamics.
There exists some δ¯ > 0, and ¯ > 0 (which are functions of utilities of G but not δ) such
that if δ < δ¯, then the empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge to{
x
∣∣∣∣ ||x− xk|| ≤ 4f(Mδ)ML + f(Mδ + ), for some equilibrium xk
}
, (16)
for any  such that ¯ ≥  > 0, where f : R+ → R+ is an upper semicontinuous function
satisfying f(x)→ 0 as x→ 0.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the Appendix, and it has three main steps illus-
trated in Figures 5 and 6. As explained earlier, for small δ and , the Mδ+ -equilibrium set
of the game is contained in disjoint neighborhoods of the equilibria of the game. Lemma 6.3
implies that potential evaluated at µt increases outside this approximate equilibrium set with
strategy updates. In the proof, we first quantify the increase in the potential, when µt leaves
this approximate equilibrium set and returns back to it at a later time instant (see Figure
5a). Then, using this increase condition we show that for sufficiently large t, µt can visit
the approximate equilibrium set infinitely often only around one equilibrium, say xk′ (see
Figure 5b). This holds since, the increase condition guarantees that the potential increases
significantly when µt leaves the neighborhood of an equilibrium xk, and reaches to that of
xk′ . Finally, using the increase condition one more time, we establish that if after time T ,
µt visits the approximate equilibrium set only in the neighborhood of xk′ , we can construct
a neighborhood of xk′ , which contains µt for all t > T (see Figure 6). This neighborhood is
expressed in (16).
Observe that if δ = 0, i.e., the original game is a potential game, then f(Mδ) = 0,
and Theorem 6.2 implies that empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge to the f()-
neighborhood of equilibria for any  such that ¯ ≥  > 0. Thus, choosing  arbitrarily small,
and observing that limx→0 f(x) = 0, our result implies that in potential games, empirical
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φ(µt′) > φ(µt)
xk
µt
xk′
µt′
(a) If empirical frequencies leave an approximate
equilibrium set at time t, and return back to it at
t′, then φ(µt′) > φ(µt).
xk′
xk
(b) For sufficiently large t, µt visits the component
of the approximate equilibrium set contained in the
neighborhood of a single equilibrium.
Figure 5: For small δ and , Mδ+ -equilibrium set (enclosed by solid lines around equilibria
xk′ and xk) is contained in disjoint neighborhoods of equilibria. If the empirical frequency
distribution, µt, is outside this approximate equilibrium set, then the potential increases with
each strategy update. Assume that empirical frequency distribution leaves an approximate
equilibrium set (at time t) and returns back to it at a later time instant (t′ > t). We first
quantify the resulting increase in the potential (left). If µt travels from the component of the
approximate equilibrium set in the neighborhood of equilibrium xk to that in the neighbor-
hood of equilibrium xk′ , then the increase in the potential is significant, and consequently
µt cannot visit the approximate equilibrium set in the neighborhood of equilibrium xk at a
later time instant (right).
r
xk′
µT
µt
Figure 6: If after time T , µt only visits the approximate equilibrium set in the neighborhood
of a single equilibrium xk′ , then we can establish that µt never leaves a neighborhood of this
equilibrium for t > T . The size of this neighborhood is denoted by r in the figure and can
be expressed as in Theorem 6.2.
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frequencies converge to the set of Nash equilibria. Hence, as a special case of Theorem 6.2,
we obtain the convergence result of Monderer and Shapley (1996a).
Assume that δ 6= 0 and a small  < ¯ is given. If δ is sufficiently small then f(Mδ)/ ≈ 0,
since limx→0 f(x) = 0. Consequently,
4f(Mδ)ML

+ f(Mδ + ) is small, and Theorem 6.2
establishes convergence of empirical frequencies to a small neighborhood of equilibria. Thus,
we conclude that for games that are close to potential games, i.e., for δ  1, Theorem 6.2
establishes convergence of empirical frequencies to a small neighborhood of equilibria.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we present a framework for studying the limiting behavior of adaptive
learning dynamics in finite strategic form games by exploiting their relation to nearby po-
tential games. We restrict our attention to better/best response, logit response and fictitious
play dynamics. We show that for near-potential games trajectories of better/best response
dynamics converge to -equilibrium sets, where  depends on closeness to a potential game.
We study the stochastically stable strategy profiles of logit response dynamics and prove that
they are contained in the set of strategy profiles that approximately maximize the potential
function of a nearby potential game. In the case of fictitious play we focus on the empirical
frequencies of players’ actions, and establish that they converge to a small neighborhood of
equilibria in near-potential games. Our results suggest that games that are close to a poten-
tial game inherit the dynamical properties (such as convergence to approximate equilibrium
sets) of potential games. Additionally, since a close potential game to a given game can be
found by solving a convex optimization problem, as discussed in Section 3, this enables us
to study dynamical properties of strategic form games by first identifying a nearby poten-
tial game to this game, and then studying the dynamical properties of the nearby potential
game.
The framework presented in this paper opens up a number of interesting research direc-
tions. Among them, we mention the following:
Heterogeneous update rules:. In this paper we only analyzed the update rules in which players
update their strategies using the same mechanism. For instance, we assumed that all players
adopt best response, or logit response dynamics with the same parameter. The limiting
behavior of dynamic processes, where players adhere to different update rules is still an open
question, even for potential games. An interesting future research question is whether the
techniques in this paper can be used to understand the limiting behavior of such update
rules. For example, consider a potential game where all players update their strategies using
logit response with different but “close” τ parameters. Can the outcome of this dynamic
process be approximated with the outcome of logit response in a close potential game where
all players use the same parameter for their updates?
Guaranteeing desirable limiting behavior:. Another promising research direction is to use
our understanding of simple update rules, such as better/best response and logit response
dynamics to design mechanisms that guarantee desirable limiting behavior, such as low
efficiency loss and “fair” outcomes. It is well known that equilibria in games can be very
different in terms of such properties (Roughgarden 2005). Hence, it is of interest to develop
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update rules that converge to a particular equilibrium, thus providing equilibrium refinement
in the limit, or to find mechanisms that modify the underlying game in a way that can induce
desirable limiting behavior. It has been shown in some cases that simple pricing mechanisms
can ensure convergence to desirable equilibria in near-potential games (Candogan et al.
2010a). It is an interesting research direction to extend such mechanisms to general games.
Dynamics in “near” zero-sum and supermodular games:. Dynamical properties of simple
update rules in zero-sum games and supermodular games are also well understood (Shamma
and Arslan 2004, Milgrom and Roberts 1990). If a game is close to a zero-sum game or
a supermodular game, does it still inherit some of the dynamical properties of the original
game? If such “continuity” properties do not hold, then the results on dynamical properties
of these classes of games may be fragile. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate whether
analogous results to the ones in this paper can be established for these classes of games.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6.1:. (i) The mixed extension of ν can be given as in (8):
ν(x) =
∑
p∈E
ν(p)
∏
k∈M
xk(pk).
Hence ν(x) is equal to the sum of Lipschitz continuous functions {ν(p)∏k∈M xk(pk)}p∈E.
The claim follows since, as a function of x ∈∏m∈M∆Em, the Lipschitz constant of
ν(p)
∏
k∈M x
k(pk) is bounded by ν(p)
√
M ≤ ν(p)M .
(ii) Let ν :
∏
m∈M∆E
m → R be a function such that
ν(x) = − max
m∈M,pm∈Em
(
um(pm,x−m)− um(xm,x−m)) . (A.1)
It follows from the definition of -equilibrium that a strategy profile x is an -equilibrium if
and only if ν(x) ≥ −.
By (i), it follows that mixed extensions of utility functions are Lipschitz continuous.
Thus, the difference um(pm,x−m) − um(xm,x−m) is Lipschitz continuous in x. Since ν is
obtained from maximum of finitely many such functions, we conclude that it is Lipschitz
continuous with some constant L. It follows that if ||x − y|| < θ, then |ν(x) − ν(y)| < Lθ.
Thus, choosing θ < γ/L, and recalling that x is an -equilibrium if and only if ν(x) ≥ −,
the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 6.2:. (i) Consider the graph of g, i.e., S = {(v,x)|v ∈ R,x ∈ g(v)}. The
definition of g suggests that S can alternatively be written as
S =
{
(v,x) ∈ R×
∏
m∈M
∆Em
∣∣∣∣∣ ν(x) ≥ −v
}
(A.2)
Since ν is upper semicontinuous, the function h : R×∏m∈M∆Em, such that h(v,x) = ν(x)+
v, is also an upper semicontinuous function. Since upper level sets of upper semicontinuous
functions are closed (see Berge (1963)), the set
{
(v,x) ∈ R×∏m∈M∆Em|h(v,x) ≥ 0}, or
equivalently S is a closed subset of R ×∏m∈M∆Em. Thus, the graph of g is closed, and
since
∏
m∈M∆E
m is a compact set the claim follows from Definition 6.2.
(ii) Let ν :
∏
m∈M∆E
m → R be as in (A.1). i.e.,
ν(x) = − max
m∈M,pm∈Em
(
um(pm,x−m)− um(xm,x−m)) .
As explained in the proof of Lemma 6.1, x is an -equilibrium if and only if ν(x) ≥ −.
The claim follows from part (i) by noting that ν is a continuous function, and g(α) = Xα =
{x|ν(x) ≥ −α}.
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Proof of Corollary 6.1:. Let n = Mδ+
1
n
for n ∈ Z+. Observe that since the mixed extension
of the potential function is continuous, C and Cn are closed sets for any n ∈ Z+. Since C is
closed miny∈C ||x− y|| is well-defined for any x ∈
∏
m∈M∆E
m.
We claim that for any θ > 0 the set
Sθ =
{
x ∈
∏
m∈M
∆Em
∣∣∣∣miny∈C ||x− y|| < θ
}
, (A.3)
is such that Cn ⊂ Sθ for some n. Note that if this claim holds, then it follows from
Theorem 6.1 that there exists some Tθ such that for all t > Tθ we have µt ∈ Sθ. Using the
definition of Sθ given in (A.3), this implies
lim sup
t→∞
min
x∈C
||x− µt|| < θ. (A.4)
Moreover, since θ > 0 is arbitrary, and ||x− µt|| ≥ 0, using (A.4) we obtain
lim
t→∞
min
x∈C
||x− µt|| = 0.
Thus, if we prove Cn ⊂ Sθ for some n, it follows that µt converges to C.
In order to prove Cn ⊂ Sθ we first obtain a certificate which can be used to guarantee
that a mixed strategy profile belongs to Sθ. Then, we show that for large enough n any
z ∈ Cn satisfies this certificate, and hence belongs to Sθ.
It follows from Lemma 6.2 (i) (by setting ν = φ and v = −miny∈XMδ φ(y)) and definition
of upper semicontinuity (Definition 6.2) that there exists γ > 0 such that θ neighborhood
of {x|φ(x) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y)} contains {x|φ(x) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y) − γ}. Hence, for any z
satisfying φ(z) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y) − γ there exists some x satisfying φ(x) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y)
and ||x− z|| < θ. Note that the definition of Sθ implies that z for which there exists such x
belongs to Sθ. Thus, if φ(z) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y)− γ it follows that z ∈ Sθ.
We next show that for large enough n, any z which belongs to Cn , satisfies the above
certificate and hence belongs to Sθ. Let L denote the Lipschitz constant for the mixed
extension of φ, as given in Lemma 6.1 (i), and define θ′ = γ/L > 0. Lemma 6.2 (ii) and
Definition 6.2 imply that for large enough n, XMδ+ 1
n
is contained in θ′ neighborhood of XMδ,
i.e., if y ∈ XMδ+ 1
n
then there exists x ∈ XMδ such that ||x− y|| < θ′. Moreover, by Lemma
6.1 (i), it follows that φ(y) ≥ φ(x) − Lθ′ = φ(x) − γ. Thus, we conclude that there exists
large enough n such that
min
y∈XMδ+1/n
φ(y) ≥ min
y∈XMδ
φ(y)− γ. (A.5)
Let z ∈ Cn for some n for which (A.5) holds. By definition of C it follows that φ(z) ≥
miny∈XMδ+1/n φ(y). Thus, (A.5) implies that φ(z) ≥ miny∈XMδ φ(y)− γ. However, as argued
before such z belong to Sθ. Hence, we have established that for large enough n, if z ∈ Cn
then z ∈ Sθ. Therefore, the claim follows.
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Proof of Theorem 6.2:. Assume that G has l equilibria, denoted by x1, . . . ,xl. Define the
minimum pairwise distance between the equilibria as d , mini 6=j ||xi−xj||. Let f : R+ → R+
be a function such that
f(α) = max
x∈Xα
min
k∈{1,...,l}
||x− xk||, (A.6)
for all α ∈ R+. Note that mink∈{1,...,l} ||x − xk|| is continuous in x, since it is minimum
of finitely many continuous functions. Moreover, Xα is a compact set, since -equilibria are
defined by finitely many inequality constraints of the form (9). Therefore, in (A.6) maximum
is achieved and f is well-defined for all α ≥ 0. From the definition of f , it follows that the
union of closed balls of radius f(α), centered at equilibria, contain α-equilibrium set of the
game. Thus, intuitively, f(α) captures the size of a closed neighborhood of equilibria, which
contains α-equilibria of the underlying game. This is illustrated in Figure A.7.
Xα
xk
f (α)
Figure A.7: Consider a game with a unique equilibrium xk. The α-equilibrium set of the
game (enclosed by a solid line around xk) is contained in the f(α) neighborhood of this
equilibrium.
Let a > 0 be such that f(a) < d/4, i.e., every a-equilibrium is at most d/4 distant
from an equilibrium of a game. Lemma 6.2 (ii) implies (using upper semicontinuity at
α = 0) that such a exists. Since d is defined as the minimum pairwise distance between
the equilibria, it follows that a-equilibria of the game are contained in disjoint f(a) < d/4
neighborhoods around equilibria of the game, i.e., if x ∈ Xa, then ||x−xk|| ≤ f(a) for exactly
one equilibrium xk. Moreover, for a1 ≤ a, since Xa1 ⊂ Xa, it follows that a1-equilibria of the
game are contained in disjoint neighborhoods of equilibria.
We prove the theorem in 5 steps summarized below. First two steps explore the properties
of function f , and define δ¯ and ¯ presented in the theorem statement. Last three steps are the
main steps of the proof, where we establish convergence of fictitious play to a neighborhood
of equilibria.
• Step 1: We first show that f is (i) weakly increasing, (ii) upper semicontinuous, and
it satisfies (iii) f(0) = 0, (iv) f(x)→ 0 as x→ 0.
• Step 2: We show that there exists some δ¯ > 0 and ¯ > 0 such that the following
inequalities hold:
Mδ¯ + ¯ < a, (A.7)
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and
f(Mδ¯ + ¯) <
(a−Mδ¯)d
24LM
. (A.8)
We will prove the statement of the theorem assuming that 0 ≤ δ < δ¯, and establish
convergence to the set in (16), for any  such that 0 <  ≤ ¯. As can be seen from the
definition of a and f (see (A.6)), the first inequality guarantees that Mδ¯+ ¯-equilibrium
set is contained in disjoint neighborhoods of equilibria, and the second one guarantees
that these neighborhoods are small. In Step 4, we will exploit this observation, and use
the inequalities in (A.7) and (A.8) to establish that the empirical frequency distribution
µt can visit the component of XMδ+¯ contained in the neighborhood of only a single
equilibrium infinitely often.
• Step 3: Let 1, 2 be such that 2 > 1 > 0. Assume that (i) at some time instant T ,
µt is contained in XMδ+1 , (ii) at time instants T1 and T2 (such that T2 > T1 > T ) µt
leaves XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 respectively and (iii) at time instants T ′2 and T ′1 (such that
T ′1 > T
′
2 > T2) µt returns back to XMδ+2 and XMδ+1 respectively. In Figure A.8, the
path µt follows between T1 and T
′
1 is illustrated.
In this step, we provide a lower bound on φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1), i.e., the increase in the
potential when µt follows such a path. This lower bound holds for any 1 and 2
provided that 2 > 1 > 0. We use this result by choosing different values for 1 and 2
in Steps 4 and 5.
Our lower bound in Step 3 is a function of 2. In addition to this lower bound, in Steps
4 and 5, we use the Mδ + 1 equilibrium set and Lipschitz continuity of the potential
to provide an upper bound on φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1) as a function of 1. Thus, properties
of Mδ + 1 and Mδ + 2 equilibrium sets are exploited for obtaining upper and lower
bounds on φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1) respectively. We establish convergence of fictitious play
updates to a neighborhood of an equilibrium by using these bounds together in Steps
4 and 5. We emphasize that allowing for two different approximate equilibrium sets
leads to better bounds on φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1), and a more informative characterization
of the limiting behavior of fictitious play, as opposed to using a single approximate
equilibrium set, i.e., setting 1 = 2.
• Step 4: Our objective in this step is to establish that fictitious play can visit the
component of an approximate equilibrium set contained in the neighborhood of only
one equilibrium infinitely often.
Let 1 = ¯ and 2 = a−Mδ¯. By (A.7) we have 1 < 2, and using the definition of a we
establish that XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 are contained in disjoint neighborhoods of equilibria.
Assume that µt leaves the components of XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 in the neighborhood of
equilibrium xk, and reaches to a similar neighborhood around equilibrium xk′ . Using
Step 3 we establish a lower bound on the increase in the potential when µt follows
such a trajectory. We also provide an upper bound, using the Lipschitz continuity of
the potential and inequalities (A.7) and (A.8). Comparing these bounds, we establish
that the maximum potential in the neighborhood of equilibrium xk is lower than the
minimum potential in the neighborhood of xk′ . Since, xk and xk′ are arbitrary, this
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observation implies that µt cannot visit the component of XMδ+1 contained in the
neighborhood of xk at a later time instant. Hence, it follows that µt visits only one
such component infinitely often.
• Step 5: In this step we show that µt converges to the approximate equilibrium set given
in the theorem statement.
Let 1, 2 be such that 0 < 1 < 2 ≤ ¯. We consider the equilibrium, whose neighbor-
hood is visited infinitely often (as obtained in Step 4), and a trajectory of µt which
leaves the components of XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 contained in the neighborhood of this
equilibrium and returns back to these sets at a later time instant (as illustrated in
Figure A.8). As in Step 4, Lipschitz continuity of φ is used to obtain an upper bound
on the increase in the potential between the end points of this trajectory. Together
with the lower bound obtained in Step 3, this provides a bound on how far µt can get
from the component of XMδ+2 contained in this neighborhood. Choosing 1 arbitrarily
small (for a fixed 2) we obtain the tightest such bound. Using this result, we quan-
tify how far µt can get from the equilibria of the game (after sufficient time) and the
theorem follows.
Next we prove each of these steps.
Step 1:. By definition Xα1 ⊂ Xα for any α1 ≤ α. Since the feasible set of the maximization
problem in (A.6) is given by Xα, this implies that f(α1) ≤ f(α), i.e., f is a weakly increasing
function of its argument. Note that the feasible set of the maximization problem in (A.6)
can be given by the correspondence g(α) = Xα, which is upper semi continuous in α as
shown in Lemma 6.2 (ii). Since as a function of x, mink∈{1,...,l} ||x − xk|| is continuous it
follows from Berge’s maximum theorem (see Berge (1963)) that for α ≥ 0, f(α) is an upper
semicontinuous function.
The set X0 corresponds to the set of equilibria of the game, hence X0 = {x1, . . . ,xl}.
Thus, the definition of f implies that f(0) = 0. Moreover, upper semicontinuity of f implies
that for any  > 0, there exists some neighborhood V of 0, such that f(x) ≤  for all x ∈ V .
Since, f(x) ≥ 0 by definition, this implies that limx→0 f(x) exists and equals to 0.
Step 2:. Let δ¯ > 0 be small enough such that Mδ¯ < a/2. Since limx→0 f(x) = 0, it follows
that for sufficiently small δ¯ and ¯, we obtain f(Mδ¯ + ¯) < ad
48LM
< (a−Mδ¯)d
24LM
and Mδ¯ + ¯ < a.
Step 3:. Let 1, 2 be such that 0 < 1 < 2. Assume T > 0 is large enough so that for t > T ,
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥ 213(t+1) if µt /∈ XMδ+1 , and similarly
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥ 223(t+1) if µt /∈ XMδ+2 .
(A.9)
Existence of T satisfying these inequalities follows from Lemma 6.3, since for large T and
t > T , this lemma implies φ(µt+1) − φ(µt) ≥ 1(t+1) + O
(
1
t2
) ≥ 21
3(t+1)
if µt /∈ XMδ+1 , and
similarly if µt /∈ XMδ+2 .
Since φ(µt) increases outsideMδ+1-equilibrium set for t > T , as (A.9) suggests, it follows
that µt visits XMδ+1 (and XMδ+2 since XMδ+1 ⊂ XMδ+2) infinitely often. Otherwise φ(µt)
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increases unboundedly, and we reach a contradiction since mixed extension of the potential
is a bounded function.
Assume that at some time after T , µt leaves XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 and returns back to
XMδ+1 at a later time instant. In this step, we quantify how much the potential increases
when µt follows such a path. We first define time instants T1, T2, T
′
1, and T
′
2 satisfying
T < T1 ≤ T2 < T ′2 ≤ T ′1, as follows:
• T1 is a time instant when µt leaves XMδ+1 , i.e., µT1−1 ∈ XMδ+1 and µt /∈ XMδ+1 for
T1 ≤ t < T ′1.
• T2 is a time instant when µt leaves XMδ+2 , i.e., µT2−1 ∈ XMδ+2 and µt /∈ XMδ+2 for
T2 ≤ t < T ′2.
• T ′2 is the first time instant after T2 when µt returns back to XMδ+2 , i.e., µT ′2−1 /∈ XMδ+2
and µT ′2 ∈ XMδ+2 .
• T ′1 is the first time instant after T1 when µt returns back to XMδ+1 , i.e., µT ′1−1 /∈ XMδ+1
and µT ′1 ∈ XMδ+1 .
The definitions are illustrated in Figure A.8. We next provide a lower bound on the quantity
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1). Note that if there are multiple time instants between T1 and T ′1 for which
µt leaves XMδ+2 (as in the figure), any of these time instants can be chosen as T2 to obtain
a lower bound.
T2
XMδ+2
XMδ+1
T1
T ′2
T ′1
Figure A.8: Trajectory of µt (initialized at the left end of the dashed line) is illustrated. T1
and T2 correspond to the time instants µt leaves XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 respectively. T ′1 and T ′2
correspond to the time instants µt enters XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 respectively.
By definition, for t such that T2 ≤ t < T ′2, we have µt /∈ XMδ+2 , and for t such that
T1 ≤ t < T2 or T ′2 ≤ t < T ′1, we have µt /∈ XMδ+1 . Thus, it follows from (A.9) that
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥ 22
3(t+ 1)
for T2 ≤ t < T ′2, (A.10)
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and consequently,
φ(µT ′2)− φ(µT2) =
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
22
3(t+ 1)
. (A.11)
Similarly, since µt /∈ XMδ+1 for t such that T1 ≤ t < T2 or T ′2 ≤ t < T ′1, using (A.9) we
establish
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT ′2) =
T ′1−1∑
t=T ′2
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥
T ′1−1∑
t=T ′2
21
3(t+ 1)
, (A.12)
φ(µT2)− φ(µT1) =
T2−1∑
t=T1
φ(µt+1)− φ(µt) ≥
T2−1∑
t=T1
21
3(t+ 1)
. (A.13)
Since φ(µT ′1)−φ(µT1) =
(
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT ′2)
)
+
(
φ(µT ′2)− φ(µT2)
)
+(φ(µT2)− φ(µT1)), it follows
from (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13) that
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1) ≥
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
22
3(t+ 1)
. (A.14)
Step 4:. Let 2 = a −Mδ¯, and 1 = ¯. By definition of ¯ and δ¯ (see Step 2), it follows that
2 > 1 > 0. Assume that δ < δ¯. Since a = Mδ¯ + 2 > Mδ + 2 > Mδ + 1 we obtain
XMδ+1 ⊂ XMδ+2 ⊂ Xa. By definition of a, Xa is contained in disjoint neighborhoods of
equilibria. Thus, it follows that components of XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 are also contained in
disjoint neighborhoods of equilibria. Hence, the definition of f suggests that if x ∈ XMδ+1
then ||xk − x|| ≤ f(Mδ + 1) (similarly if x ∈ XMδ+2 , then ||xk − x|| ≤ f(Mδ + 2)) for
exactly one equilibrium xk.
Let T1, T2, T
′
1 and T
′
2 be defined as in Step 3. In this step, by obtaining an upper bound on
φ(µT ′1)−φ(µT1) and refining the lower bound obtained in Step 3 for given values of 1 and 2,
we prove that after sufficient time µt can visit the component of XMδ+1 in the neighborhood
of a single equilibrium.
Assume that µt leaves the component of the Mδ + 1-equilibrium set in the neighborhood
of equilibrium xk, and it reaches to another component in the neighborhood of equilibrium
xk′ . Since, by definition µT1−1, µT ′1 ∈ XMδ+1 , and µT2−1, µT ′2 ∈ XMδ+2 , it follows that
µT1−1 and µT2−1 belong to neighborhoods of equilibrium xk, whereas, µT ′1 and µT ′2 belong to
neighborhoods of xk′ , i.e.,
||xk − µT1−1|| ≤ f(Mδ + 1) and ||xk − µT2−1|| ≤ f(Mδ + 2), whereas, (A.15)
||xk′ − µT ′1|| ≤ f(Mδ + 1) and ||xk′ − µT ′2|| ≤ f(Mδ + 2). (A.16)
By definition of d we have ||xk−xk′ || ≥ d. Since a > Mδ+2, it follows that f(Mδ+2) ≤
f(a) < d/4, and hence the second inequalities in (A.15) and (A.16) imply
||µT ′2 − µT2−1|| >
d
2
. (A.17)
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Using this inequality, we next refine the lower bound on φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1) obtained in
Step 3. By (10), with an update at time t, the empirical frequency distribution can change
by at most
||µt+1 − µt|| = 1
t+ 1
||µt − It|| ≤ 1
t+ 1
(||µt||+ ||It||) ≤ 2M
t+ 1
, (A.18)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that µt = {µmt }m∈M, and It = {Imt }m∈M, and
||µmt ||, ||Imt || ≤ 1, since Imt , µmt ∈ ∆Em. Hence, if T2 is sufficiently large, then ||µT2 − µT2−1||
is small enough so that (A.17) implies ||µT ′2 − µT2|| > d2 . Using this together with (A.18), we
conclude
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
2M
t+ 1
≥
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
||µt+1 − µt|| ≥ ||
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
µt+1 − µt|| = ||µT ′2 − µT2|| >
d
2
. (A.19)
Thus, the lower bound on φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1) provided in (A.14) takes the following form:
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1) ≥
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
22
3(t+ 1)
≥ 2d
6M
. (A.20)
Next we provide an upper bound on φ(µT ′1)−φ(µT1), using Lipschitz continuity of the po-
tential and the properties of theMδ+1 equilibrium set. Let φk = max{x | ||x−xk||≤f(Mδ+1)} φ(x),
and define yk as a strategy profile which achieves this maximum. Similarly, let φk′ =
min{x | ||x−xk′ ||≤f(Mδ+1)} φ(x) and define yk′ as a strategy profile which achieves this min-
imum. Observe that
φ
k′
− φk = φ(yk′)− φ(yk)
=
(
φ(yk′)− φ(µT ′1)
)
+
(
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1)
)
+ (φ(µT1)− φ(yk)) .
(A.21)
Note that by (A.15) and (A.16), and the definitions of yk and yk′ , we have µT ′1 ,yk′ ∈{x | ||x − xk′ || ≤ f(Mδ + 1)}, and µT1−1,yk ∈ {x | ||x − xk|| ≤ f(Mδ + 1)}. Hence,
using Lipschitz continuity of φ (and denoting the Lipschitz constant by L) it follows that
φ(yk′) − φ(µT ′1) ≥ −2Lf(Mδ + 1), and φ(µT1−1) − φ(yk) ≥ −2Lf(Mδ + 1). Moreover,
(A.18) and Lipschitz continuity of φ imply that φ(µT1) − φ(µT1−1) = O
(
1
T1
)
. Thus, using
(A.21) we obtain the following upper bound on φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1):
φ
k′
− φk + 4Lf(Mδ + 1) +O
(
1
T1
)
≥ φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1). (A.22)
Using the lower and upper bounds we obtained in (A.20) and (A.22), it follows that
φ
k′
− φk + 4Lf(Mδ + 1) +O
(
1
T1
)
≥ 2d
6M
. (A.23)
Since 2 = a−Mδ¯, and 1 = ¯, using the fact that f is an increasing function and δ < δ¯,
it follows from (A.23) that
φ
k′
− φk ≥
(a−Mδ¯)d
6M
− 4Lf(Mδ + ¯) +O
(
1
T1
)
≥ (a−Mδ¯)d
6M
− 4Lf(Mδ¯ + ¯) +O
(
1
T1
)
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Note that (A.8) implies (a−Mδ¯)d
6M
−4Lf(Mδ¯+ ¯) > 0. Thus, for sufficiently large T1 we obtain
φ
k′
− φk > 0. Therefore, we conclude when µt leaves the component of XMδ+1 contained
in the neighborhood of some equilibrium xk, and enters that of another equilibrium xk′ ,
then the minimum potential in the new neighborhood is strictly larger than the maximum
potential in the older one (for sufficiently large T1). Since this is true for arbitrary equilibria
xk and xk′ , it follows that after entering the component of XMδ+1 in the neighborhood of
xk′ , µt cannot return to the component in the neighborhood of xk, as doing so contradicts
with the relation between the minimum and maximum potentials in these neighborhoods.
Thus, after sufficient time, µt can visit the component of XMδ+1 (or equivalently XMδ+¯) in
the neighborhood of a single equilibrium.
Step 5:. Let 1, and 2 be such that 0 < 1 < 2 ≤ ¯. As established in Step 4, there exists
some T , such that for t > T, µt visits the component of XMδ+¯, in the neighborhood of a
single equilibrium, say xk.
Assume that T1, T2, T
′
1 and T
′
2 are defined as in Step 3, and let T1 > T + 1. Since
1 < 2 ≤ ¯, we have XMδ+1 ⊂ XMδ+2 ⊂ XMδ+¯, and T1 > T + 1 implies that µt can only
visit the components of XMδ+1 and XMδ+2 contained in the neighborhood of xk. Following
a similar approach to Step 4, we next obtain upper and lower bounds on φ(µT ′1)−φ(µT1), and
use these bounds to establish convergence to the mixed equilibrium set given in the theorem
statement.
Define d∗ as the maximum distance of µt from XMδ+2 for t such that T + 1 < T2 ≤ t ≤
T ′2 − 1, i.e.,
d∗ = max
{t|T2≤t≤T ′2−1}
min
x∈XMδ+2
||µt − x||.
Since µT2−1, µT ′2 ∈ XMδ+2 by definition, the total length of the trajectory between T2 − 1
and T ′2 is an upper bound on 2d
∗, i.e.,
2d∗ ≤
T ′2−1∑
t=T2−1
||µt+1 − µt||.
As explained in (A.18), ||µt+1 − µt|| ≤ 2Mt+1 , thus the above inequality implies
2d∗ ≤
T ′2−1∑
t=T2−1
2M
t+ 1
=
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
2M
t+ 1
+
2M
T2
. (A.24)
Using this inequality, the lower bound in (A.14) implies
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1) ≥
T ′2−1∑
t=T2
22
3(t+ 1)
≥
(
d∗ − M
T2
)
22
3M
(A.25)
We next obtain an upper bound on φ(µT ′1)−φ(µT1). By definition of f , XMδ+1 is contained
in f(Mδ + 1) neighborhoods of equilibria. For T1 > T + 1, µt can only visit the component
of XMδ+1 in the neighborhood of xk, as can be seen from the definition of T . Thus, since
µT1−1, µT ′1 ∈ XMδ+1 , it follows that µT1−1, µT ′1 ∈ {x | ||x− xk|| ≤ f(Mδ+ 1)}. By Lipschitz
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continuity of the potential function it follows that φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1−1) ≤ 2f(Mδ + 1)L.
Additionally, by (A.18) Lipschitz continuity also implies that φ(µT1) − φ(µT1−1) ≤ 2MLT1 .
Combining these we obtain the following upper bound on φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1):
φ(µT ′1)− φ(µT1) ≤ 2f(Mδ + 1)L+
2ML
T1
. (A.26)
It follows from the upper and lower bounds on φ(µT ′1) − φ(µT1) given in (A.25) and (A.26)
that (
d∗ − M
T2
)
22
3M
≤ 2f(Mδ + 1)L+ 2ML
T1
Thus, for sufficiently large T1 (and hence T2), we obtain
d∗ ≤ 3f(Mδ + 1)ML
2
+
3M2L
2T1
+
M
T2
≤ 4f(Mδ + 1)ML
2
. (A.27)
Note that in the above derivation 1 is an arbitrary number that satisfies 0 < 1 < 2.
Thus, (A.27) implies that
d∗ ≤ lim sup
1→0
4f(Mδ + 1)ML
2
≤ 4f(Mδ)ML
2
, (A.28)
where the last inequality follows by upper semicontinuity of f . Thus, by definition of d∗, we
conclude that µt converges d
∗ neighborhood of XMδ+2 . Hence, using (A.28), we can establish
convergence of µt to{
x
∣∣∣∣ ||x− y|| ≤ 4f(Mδ)ML2 , for some y ∈ XMδ+2
}
. (A.29)
Observe that definition of f implies if y ∈ XMδ+2 , then for some equilibrium xk we have
||xk − y|| ≤ f(Mδ + 2). Thus, using (A.29) and triangle inequality, we conclude that µt
converges to{
x
∣∣∣∣ ||x− xk|| ≤ 4f(Mδ)ML2 + f(Mδ + 2), for some equilibrium xk
}
. (A.30)
Noting that in (A.30) 2 is an arbitrary number satisfying 0 < 2 ≤ ¯, the theorem follows.
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